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Article 
Form and Function in the National Security 
Constitution  
DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN 
Since Alexander Hamilton first wrote of the functional virtues of the presidency in 
matters of foreign affairs, his claim that a unitary executive is specially blessed with 
advantages of “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” has been invoked regularly to 
argue for a limited role for Congress in national security decision-making, and even more 
rigorous deference to executive preferences by the courts.  The Hamiltonian virtues have 
proven particularly compelling to a modern set of functionalist scholars, from Bruce 
Ackerman to John Yoo, who rely on the same metrics of institutional competence to defend 
executive-heavy security detention programs (and other initiatives) against separation-of-
powers arguments that the Constitution requires greater multi-branch engagement.  
While embracing the relevance of functional considerations in separation-of-powers 
disputes, this Article rejects the notion that unitary executive power is the structural 
arrangement most functionally advantageous for combating terrorism and associated 
threats.  Although some terrorist-related events are “emergencies” that may implicate the 
Hamiltonian virtues, the new functionalist tendency to view counterterrorism only through 
the lens of emergency power exaggerates the importance of high-speed rights-security 
trade-offs, and obscures the range of trade-offs any security decision-making structure must 
confront—including regular trade-offs between strategy and tactics.  Moreover, as 
organization theory helps demonstrate, while flexibility, unity, and speed can have 
advantages in the management of high-consequence risk, they also carry significant 
disadvantages that traditional separation-of-powers interpretation ignores, and that bear 
directly on the efficacy of executive-only decision structures.  In the end, the alternative 
approach to evaluating comparative institutional competence proposed here leads to a far 
more favorable view of the functional desirability of multi-branch participation in 
programs geared to addressing the terrorist threat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1551 
II.  THE PERSISTENT FORMAL–FUNCTIONAL DIVIDE ................... 1555 
A.  THE AGE-OLD DEBATE ..................................................................... 1555 
B.  THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY FUNCTIONALISTS ............................ 1562 
C.  FUNCTIONALISM AS A FACTOR: PURPOSES AND EFFECTS .................. 1571 
III.  REASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS ................................................... 1586 
A.  NEW FUNCTIONALIST EFFECTIVENESS .............................................. 1589 
B.  AN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS APPROACH: MANAGING HIGH 
CONSEQUENCE RISK ..................................................................... 1598 
IV.  REVISITING THE HAMILTONIAN VIRTUES: FUNCTIONAL 
SECURITY DETENTION .................................................................. 1618 
A.  UNITARY EXECUTIVE DETENTION ..................................................... 1620 
B.  ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION ........................................................... 1622 
C.  STANDARD DETENTION ..................................................................... 1624 
V.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 1626 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Form and Function in the National Security 
Constitution  
DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While scholarly and judicial debate about the constitutional power of 
the American executive is broad and deep, constitutional understanding of 
the functional virtues of the executive branch in matters of national 
security policy is remarkably little changed since Alexander Hamilton 
wrote of them more than two hundred years ago.  Those who advocate 
broad executive power in national security have long invoked Hamilton’s 
belief that a unitary executive is specially blessed with advantages of 
“[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” to argue in favor of a limited 
role for Congress in national security decision-making, and even more 
rigorous deference to executive preferences by the courts.1  Recent claims 
of executive functional supremacy in matters of national security are much 
the same.  Since 9/11, an ideologically diverse array of scholars, from 
Bruce Ackerman to John Yoo, have argued that the most pressing modern 
threats to national security—particularly terrorism and the threat of 
“weapons of mass destruction”—demand more than ever the flexibility to 
act with secrecy and dispatch, qualities unique to the unitary executive and 
essential to the preservation of national security.2  Accordingly, these new 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public & International Affairs, Princeton University.  The Author wishes to thank Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Kim Lane Scheppele, and the Program in Law and Public Affairs at Princeton University for 
their support during the preparation of this Article.  Thanks also to Robert Ahdieh, Paul Berman, 
Christopher Borgen, Christopher F. Chyba, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Lynn Eden, Martin Flaherty, 
Carol Heimer, Stanley Katz, Peter Lindseth, Martha Minow, Charles Perrow, and Scott D. Sagan for 
helpful discussions.  Special thanks to Wendy Liu for research assistance. 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).  
Hamiltonian arguments in favor of executive functional supremacy are addressed in Part II.  
2 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM 3–4, 13–14 (2006) (arguing for “emergency constitution” in face of growing 
terrorist threats); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 56 (2007) (“Our original constitutional structure, with a relatively weak 
presidency, reflects the concerns of the eighteenth century and is not well adapted to current 
conditions.”); John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 813–22 
(2004) (arguing that post–September 11th world poses threats that require affording President greater 
flexibility in decisions involving the use of force); see also PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. 
KAYYEM, LONG-TERM LEGAL STRATEGY PROJECT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM  9 (2004), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ 
ltls_final_5_3_05.pdf (“The ability of the United States to successfully fight the war on terrorism 
requires giving the President the power and flexibility to respond quickly and effectively to terrorist 
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functionalists tend to favor national security decision-making structures 
with loose (if any) emergency-driven congressional engagement, and 
deferential (if any) judicial review.3   
The staying power of the Hamiltonian virtues in constitutional analyses 
of executive power is striking in light of the radical changes that have 
occurred in the nature of executive branch decision-making since the 
Constitution’s founding—changes driven in no small part by the advent of 
the administrative state and by the two-hundred-plus years of post-
Hamilton study of organizational decision-making.  Indeed, the new 
functionalist commitment to this vision of executive competence is 
particularly puzzling.  In a world where the security threats are, it is often 
argued, so different from those posed by “traditional war” (one nation-state 
against another), why would Hamilton’s vision of a competent executive, 
forged in precisely that state-against-state world, remain salient?   
Part of the puzzling stasis in separation-of-powers thinking in the 
national security context might be explained by lines drawn in the 
centuries-old debate over formal and functional approaches to resolving 
separation-of-powers disputes.  Formalists, broadly speaking, look to the 
Constitution’s text, structure, and history in an attempt to discern which 
powers are “executive,” which are “legislative,” and which are “judicial” 
in nature.  Functionalists, a more diverse group, look more to 
considerations of actual effectiveness (what works in a given policy 
context?) or constitutional purpose (why separate powers in the first 
place?) in resolving such disputes.4  When it comes to matters of national 
security, those advocating broad executive power have made some mostly 
unsuccessful attempts at formal support for their position, but they have 
been uniform in embracing the importance of functionalist concerns.5  At 
the same time, those seeking limits on executive power have fiercely 
defended the formal textual, structural and historical arguments for 
allocating to Congress an equal or greater role in national security affairs.  
But they have not much challenged the idea that the executive wins the 
functional battle of the branches, either as to which has key functional 
competences in dealing with matters of national security (the executive) or 
why that is the case (unity, secrecy and dispatch).6   
The result of these traditional battle lines has been to ensure that when 
it comes to national security, the separation-of-powers debate about the 
executive’s functional strengths has yet to be joined.  This Article is an 
                                                                                                                          
threats.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE  CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006) (advocating allowing greater executive flexibility to respond to modern security 
threats). 
3 See infra Part II.B. 
4 The contours of the formalist v. functionalist interpretive debate are sketched in Part II.A. 
5 See infra text accompanying note 28.   
6 See infra text accompanying note 38.  
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attempt to do so.  It engages the new functionalist approach to separation 
of powers in two ways.  First, it considers whether functional 
considerations should matter at all in interpreting the structural provisions 
of the Constitution, and if so, what guidance the Constitution offers as to 
what those considerations should be.  While the Article embraces the 
conclusion that functional considerations must play a role in resolving 
separation-of-powers disputes, it urges against the new functionalists’ 
scattershot approach to deciding which functions rise to the level of 
mattering in constitutional law. 
Second, and more to the heart of the new functionalist project, this 
Article considers what kinds of structural arrangements might be most 
functionally advantageous for a government tasked with, among other 
things, protecting its population from terrorist attack.  It is in answering 
this latter question that some of the most critical errors in the new 
functionalist project emerge.  Perhaps most significant, the new 
functionalist inclination to understand vast swaths of government 
counterterrorism efforts as principally the subject of “emergency” powers 
is not only empirically problematic, it falsely elevates the importance of 
individual rights trade-offs in the policy program of counterterrorism 
security, obscuring the variety of trade-off decisions (beyond just 
considerations of individual liberty) that any security decision-making 
structure must make.  Here, the presumed importance of rights in 
relationship to effective security policy only compounds the deeply 
rooted—but false—expectation that executive branch security decision-
making is categorically different from any other kind of executive 
function. 
It is in highlighting the effects of this expectation that an additional 
key error becomes apparent: the new functionalists’ attention to the 
structural benefits of flexibility, unity, and speed grossly discounts the 
burdens such organizational characteristics impose on the executive branch 
security structures tasked with carrying out counterterrorism operations.  
Drawing on insights from organization theory, one can begin to identify 
why and how such burdens emerge day-to-day.  Organization analysis can 
teach, for example, how competitive organizational structures inside 
today’s complex executive branch (unitary in theory only) can make actors 
more likely to shirk core responsibilities.  The focus on organizational 
incentives makes it possible to see, for instance, why deferential review in 
some contexts may be worse than no review at all.  To be clear, this Article 
does not claim that there are no circumstances in which judicial deference 
may be appropriate.  Rather, the claim is that, given a fair weighing of the 
costs and benefits of review, these circumstances are likely far fewer than 
common understandings of executive branch competence would allow.  In 
the end, the alternative approach to evaluating the branches’ comparative 
institutional competences proposed here leads to a far more favorable view 
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of multi-branch participation in programs geared to addressing the terrorist 
threat.  
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II begins by situating current 
functionalist claims for broad executive power in the context of classic 
formal versus functional interpretive debates past.  It concludes by 
embracing a core functionalist position: while formal interpretation can 
shed critical light upon, and sometimes resolve, key disputes about the 
scope of executive power, functional analysis is often unavoidable and 
sometimes required when it comes to understanding the structural 
provisions of the Constitution.  Part II then considers the new 
functionalists’ interpretive approach in particular, exploring whether their 
model is consistent with the functional concerns that animate the 
Constitution’s separation of powers.  After identifying a series of flaws in 
their interpretive approach, the remainder of Part II proposes a different 
model of analysis that more fairly reflects the Constitution’s functional 
interests.  In this context, this Article distinguishes between interpretations 
based on familiar purposive interests (the separation-of-powers purpose of, 
for example, promoting political accountability), and more complex 
effectiveness considerations (applied questions of what works), both of 
which, this Article argues, must play a role in functional interpretation.   
Part III then delves more directly into the national security 
effectiveness considerations at the heart of the new functionalist project, 
evaluating core new functionalist claims that the more effective national 
security decision-making structure is one with expansive, flexible 
executive power and modified (if any) judicial review.  After highlighting 
key deficiencies in the new functionalist approach, Part III suggests instead 
that effectiveness assessments in the national security context have much 
to gain from the insights of organization theory.  A field that has grown up 
to inform the structure of both private firms and public administration, 
organization theory has engaged the methodologies of economics, 
sociology, political science, anthropology, and psychology to understand 
how organizations reach decisions and why.7  By identifying common 
decision-making pathologies, and by applying decision-making models to 
real-world examples of security problems, organization theorists have 
taken our understanding of executive functionality far beyond Hamilton’s 
analysis.  Political scientists, in particular, offer a growing body of 
empirical work exploring how executive branch organizations have 
responded to national security challenges, and how structural 
characteristics of those organizations have helped (or hurt) in crafting an 
effective response.  To the extent the functional demands on executive 
power play a role in constitutional reasoning, such insights offer a more 
                                                                                                                          
7 See generally CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (3d ed. 1986) 
(giving developmental overview and examination of recent approaches to organizational theory).   
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realistic set of expectations of institutional competence. 
Indeed, as applied in Part IV to one of the new functionalists’ most 
important policy interests—a security detention regime—organization 
analysis appears to favor functional characteristics that yield a very 
different kind of decision-making structure from one whose core features 
are unity, secrecy, and dispatch.  Instead, the more effective detention 
system is one that is designed to handle principally non-emergency cases, 
to incorporate planning incentives and other mechanisms that help avoid 
emergency decision-making, and to use monitoring and review to correct 
for certain known pathologies—like excessive secrecy—of the institutions 
engaged in security operations.  In closing, Part V returns briefly to the full 
set of formal and functional factors relevant to separation-of-powers 
questions to put in context the significance of its findings on 
effectiveness—namely, that separation-of-powers concerns in security 
detention lean vigorously against a unitary executive with deferential 
outside review. 
II.  THE PERSISTENT FORMAL–FUNCTIONAL DIVIDE 
A.  The Age-Old Debate 
When constitutional scholars talk about the debate between formalists 
and functionalists, they are most often engaging in a discussion about what 
method of interpretation should govern disputes over powers among 
government branches under the Constitution.  Though the general debate is 
familiar, the terms formal and functional have been used less than precisely 
to encompass a range of approaches to resolving separation-of-powers 
disputes.8  In most conceptions, “formalist” interpretation relies on the 
Constitution’s text, structure, and, to an extent, on the framers’ asserted 
intent.9  Most would add to this that formalist methodology prefers black-
letter rules to flexible standards, and, perhaps relatedly, that formalism 
prioritizes “rule of law” interests like openness, predictability, and 
                                                                                                                          
8 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998) (contrasting formal and 
functional approaches to separation-of-powers interpretation).  Compare, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal 
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489–92 (1987) (using term “functionalist” to refer to essential executive, 
legislative, and judicial functions of three branches of government), with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734 & n.34, 1740–42 (1996) (using “functionalist” to 
describe interpretation based on the purposes for which the separation-of-powers doctrine was 
developed). 
9 See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1734 (“Formalist catechism posits three discrete branches, 
each exercising one of three distinct powers.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation 
of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138–39 (2000) (“The rules are derived from specific sources: 
the text of the Constitution and, for some but not all commentators, the original understanding of that 
text.”). 
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reliability in law (much as stare decisis is said to do).10  Either way, the 
formalist methodology asks whether a disputed power is essentially 
legislative or executive by its nature.  As one account explains it: “[T]he 
constitutional validity of a particular branch action, from the perspective of 
separation of powers, is to be determined not by resort to functional 
balancing, but solely by the use of a definitional analysis.”11  Only the 
executive branch may exercise “executive” functions; only Congress may 
exercise “legislative” functions.12 
In the separation-of-powers case law, formalists classically point to 
support for their approach in cases such as INS v. Chadha13                                               
and Bowsher v. Synar.14  Whether invalidating the so-called legislative 
veto of executive agency action as beyond the power of one house of 
Congress to exercise (Chadha), or rejecting a statute through which 
Congress vested executive powers in an ‘agency’ official but reserved for 
itself the power to remove him from office (Bowsher), the Court has 
looked to textual and historical sources to inquire whether the challenged 
allocation of power to one branch impermissibly interfered with the 
essential functions of the other branch.15  The veto power, the removal 
power—these are essentially executive in nature, the Court has held; for 
Congress to reserve to itself such prerogatives would disrupt the 
Constitution’s central scheme.  While the centrality of the essential 
function inquiry might lead one to call this brand of interpretation 
“functionalist,” the formalist courts have been at pains to clarify what their 
inquiry was not: 
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, 
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to 
the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic 
government. . . .16 
In contrast, the label “functionalist” has most helpfully been used to 
describe those who would embrace such pragmatic concerns, typically of 
one of two varieties.  A first species of functionalist looks to the purposes 
                                                                                                                          
10 Eskridge, supra note 8, at 21–22; Magill, supra note 9, at 1138–39. 
11 Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic 
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991). 
12 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 997 
(2006); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 
1523–26 (1991) (noting formalists’ commitment to “strong substantive separations between the 
branches of government”). 
13 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
14 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
15 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732–33; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
16 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
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underlying the idea of separated powers to resolve disputes among the 
branches; they ask what works to achieve a broader constitutional goal. 
Without discounting traditional interpretive methodologies, these 
purposive functionalists find incomplete or otherwise unsatisfying answers 
in the Constitution’s text and history—and the reality of a vast and 
entrenched administrative state in which any given executive branch 
agency may simultaneously be rule-making, adjudicating, and rule-
enforcing on any given day.17  Looking beyond strictly textual cues, 
purposive functionalists ask whether an allocation of power serves the 
purpose of separating powers in the first place—for example, to constrain 
the exercise of tyrannical government powers, to ensure that government 
accurately reflects democratic preferences, or to allocate power according 
to the institutional capacity of each branch (a purposive interest this Article 
refers to as “role effectiveness” hereinafter).18   
A second species of functionalist is drawn to more immediate issues of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and the circumstantial needs of modern 
government.  Effectiveness functionalists ask, for example, which 
allocation of power produces a better raw policy outcome than another; or 
slightly more abstractly, which branch or branches of government can offer 
the best decision-making process to meet a particular kind of policy need.  
Such approaches find some of their greatest ammunition in decisions 
evaluating (and generally upholding) the constitutionality of administrative 
agency action.  A standard example is Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor, in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
Commission’s power to adjudicate customer claims about whether a broker 
had violated provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), along 
                                                                                                                          
17 See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 21 (noting that functionalist reasoning “might be understood as 
induction from constitutional policy and practice,” as opposed to “constitutional text, structure, [and] 
original intent”); Magill, supra note 9, at 1142 (noting that if the formalist approach were “consistently 
followed in the courts,” it would “require dramatic alteration of contemporary institutional 
arrangements and prevent experimentation along similar lines in the future”); Strauss, supra note 8, at 
492–93 (noting that “[v]irtually every [one of these agencies] exercises all three of the governmental 
functions”); see also Barkow, supra note 12, at 999 (noting that the “Court’s acceptance of modern 
administrative agencies poses the greatest challenge to the formalist approach to separation of 
powers”); Brown, supra note 12, at 1528–40 (offering alternatives to formalism and functionalism). 
18 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 12, at 1034–40 (urging formal approach to separation-of-powers 
questions in criminal law for “functional” reasons related to purpose of separation-of-powers doctrine); 
Brown, supra note 12, at 1531 (proposing an “ordered liberty” analysis that would settle separation-of-
powers disputes depending on “the degree to which they may tend to detract from fairness and 
accountability in the process of government”); Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 489 (identifying 
functional purposes to be protected in separation-of-powers analysis as fostering political values of 
“diversity, [popular] accountability, and checking”).  Such an approach may be seen in Supreme Court 
separation-of-powers decisions across a range of cases.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 
(1976) (pointing to framers’ purposes in establishing separation of powers); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the 
central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of 
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”) (citing 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725.  
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with brokers’ state law counterclaims involving the same transaction.19  
While recognizing that applying a formalist analysis to the dispute—which 
would identify adjudications as essentially judicial functions under Article 
III of the Constitution—would be more consistent with one line of 
separation-of-powers cases, the Schor Court was nonetheless avowedly 
pragmatic in its approach, blending purposive interests and effectiveness 
interests in its functional assessment.  
[T]he constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of 
adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be 
assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the 
requirements of Article III.  This inquiry, in turn, is guided by 
the principle that ‘practical attention to substance rather than 
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform 
application of Article III.’20 
The Court did hint later at the limits of efficacy’s relevance:  
It was only to ensure the effectiveness of [the regulatory] 
scheme that Congress authorized the [Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC)] to assert jurisdiction over 
common law counterclaims.  Indeed, . . . absent the CFTC’s 
exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations 
procedure would have been confounded. . . . [The assertion of 
CFTC] jurisdiction is limited to that which is necessary to 
make the reparations procedure workable.21   
By this view, the essential function of Article III courts was a factor to be 
considered, but the effectiveness concerns that led Congress to enact the 
CEA scheme could trump.22 
As a number of scholars have by now pointed out, each version of 
formalism and functionalism is plagued with problems.  Formalists’ 
                                                                                                                          
19 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Mistretta, 488 
U.S. 361 at 382 (“Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a 
degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of 
which ‘would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.’”) 
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121).  
20 Schor, 478 U.S. at 847–48 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 Id. at 856.  
22 See id. at 851–56 (“The CFTC adjudication of common law counterclaims is incidental to, and 
completely dependent upon, adjudication of reparations claims created by federal law, and in actual 
fact is limited to claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the reparations claim.  In 
such circumstances, the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed de 
minimis.  Conversely, were we to hold that the Legislative Branch may not permit such limited 
cognizance of common law counterclaims at the election of the parties, it is clear that we would defeat 
the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method 
for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and 
determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task.  We do not think Article III 
compels this degree of prophylaxis.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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inquiry into the identification of which functions are quintessentially 
“executive” or “legislative” in nature problematically implies the existence 
of Platonic governmental ideals of power that may or may not line up with 
the universe of possible forms of state action.  Formalists must face the 
reality of life in the modern administrative state, where strict adherence to 
formalist power divisions would likely result in the dismantling of much of 
the executive agency apparatus—today daily engaged in both rule-making 
(i.e., legislative) and adjudicative (i.e., judicial) functions.23  At the same 
time, effectiveness functionalists struggle both with how to align interests 
of efficiency and effectiveness for a given branch, and with the 
overarching separation-of-powers principle that no one branch should be 
able to exercise unlimited or tyrannical powers.24  Even purposive 
functionalists face the charge that allowing room for such broad 
considerations leaves the structural boundaries of our government open to 
a degree of indeterminacy inconsistent with the idea of law in a 
constitutional democracy.25  More than one scholar has noted how the 
black-and-white terms of the formal versus functional debate simply serve 
to obscure the issues underlying why we draw lines between the branches 
at all.26   
Yet to the extent formal and functional lines can be drawn in the 
jurisprudence and scholarship of administrative law, scholars have drawn 
them, noting that formalist analysis has been deployed to support powerful 
executive and functionalist arguments tend to favor shared power among 
the branches.27  The line-drawing exercise in the national security context, 
however, reveals the opposite divide.  As discussions of the scope of 
executive power have recurred during periods of security crisis in the 
United States, those favoring expansive executive power have been 
uniform in embracing the tools of functional analysis.  From Hamilton 
forward, the urgency of modern threats, the advent of new technological 
                                                                                                                          
23 Strauss, supra note 8, at 492–96. 
24 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, 
and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 375–76 (1990) (“I recognize that the will of 
the Founders always has about it a somewhat musty, antiquated, even shabby air, like a quaintly 
decorated table that is old enough to be a valuable antique but not sufficiently well preserved. And yet 
the single most pertinent fact about an old table is that it has survived . . . .”).  
25 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 100–02 (1995) 
(arguing functional interpretation “inherently guts the prophylactic nature of the separation-of-powers 
protections”); Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 530, 534–36 (1999) (favoring formalism as reducing error and decision-making costs in 
separation-of-powers disputes); Carter, supra note 24, at 375–76 (criticizing indeterminacy of 
functional approaches). 
26 Barkow, supra note 12, at 992–93; Magill, supra note 9, at 1129. 
27 See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1740 (describing functionalist scholars as tending to favor greater 
congressional and judicial supervision of executive power).  Note, however, that Flaherty’s bifurcation 
was based on the assumption that functionalists were concerned about purposive effectiveness 
(constraining power, protecting liberty), not raw effectiveness (developing good agricultural policy).  
Id. at 1734–37. 
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challenges, and assertedly pragmatic assessments of presidential 
competencies required to meet them have all been staples of arguments 
made by those favoring broad executive power.28  As Richard Neustadt put 
it in his landmark 1964 book, Presidential Power: “[W]hen it comes to 
action risking war, technology has modified the Constitution: the President 
perforce becomes the only such man in the system capable of exercising 
judgment under the extraordinary limits now imposed by secrecy, 
complexity, and time.”29  Indeed, the Supreme Court has, from time to 
time, given such functionalist claims at least passing cause to warrant their 
perennial invocation.30 
In contrast, the most vigorous advocates against the “imperial 
presidency’s” tendencies have generally embraced some form of the 
                                                                                                                          
28 Hamilton believed that it was impossible to set precise limits on the federal executive power 
“because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis omitted).  
Because “[t]he circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,” Hamilton explained, “no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”  Id. at 
184–85.  The federal government, therefore, had to have all power necessary to “insure domestic 
Tranquility” and “provide for the common defence.”  U.S. CONST. pmbl.  In the twentieth century, 
scholars continued to invoke Hamilton to support claims of broad executive power in times of security 
threat.  See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Foreword to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, at ix, x (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (“The respective 
roles of Congress and the President developed according to their structural capacities and limitations.  
Congress, consisting of 535 members assisted by huge staffs, is obviously incapable of swift, decisive, 
and flexible action in the employment of armed force.”); Robert Bork, Erosion of the President’s 
Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 698 (1990) (“The need for Presidents to have that 
power [to use force abroad without waiting for congressional authorization], particularly in the modern 
age, should be obvious to almost anyone.”); J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th 
Century Under an 18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1–2, 7 (1961) (asking “whether in 
the face of the harsh necessities of the 1960’s we can afford the luxury of 18th century procedures of 
measured deliberation”); John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs 
and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 305–07 (noting that “the structure of the presidency as a single office 
possessed by one person also gives the executive unique capabilities of acting with ‘secrecy and 
dispatch’”); John O. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1317, 1320–21 (1997) (“The Framers understood that the conduct of war must be entrusted to 
executive.”); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 
833, 871 (1972) (“The circumstances of modern world politics, however, require Presidents to act 
quickly, and often alone.”). 
29 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 187–88 (1964).  For a thoughtful historical 
account of Neustadt’s and others’ influence on the case for an “imperial” presidency, see Louis Fisher, 
The Law: Scholarly Support for Presidential Wars, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 590 (2005).   
30 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The President 
. . . manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine 
when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. . . .  
The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and 
their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.”) (quoting U.S. Senate, Reports, Committee 
on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, at 24 (Feb. 15, 1816)); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 
683 (1981) (“The continued mutual amity between the nation and other powers again and again 
depends upon a satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such 
compromises has existed from the earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of all 
civilized nations.”) (quoting Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951)).  
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formalism defined above.31  In the 1980s and 1990s, the approach was 
crystallized in the writings of scholars like Harold Koh and John Hart 
Ely.32  Writing largely in response to perceived executive excesses during 
Vietnam and the Iran-Contra affair, Ely, for example, rejected arguments 
that modern threats and longstanding practice had made the Constitution’s 
initial allocation of war powers to Congress obsolete.  Except for the 
presidential power to “repel sudden attacks,” and the President’s power as 
Commander-in-Chief to assume tactical control of a war once declared, the 
government’s so-called war powers (in particular, the power to deploy 
military force) were vested in Congress by the Constitution’s text and 
intent.33   
Koh’s interpretive sources were broader than Ely’s.  In addition to 
constitutional text, structure and history, Koh looked to “framework” 
national security statutes and “quasi-constitutional custom” (the last only 
as persuasive, not controlling authority) for insight into the separation of 
national security powers.34  But his conclusion was formal in nature: the 
Constitution establishes a system of “balanced institutional participation,” 
with the core war powers, and their allocation among the branches, visible 
first and foremost in the text. 35  While Koh was deeply critical of the 
formalist approach taken by the Supreme Court in Chadha, the alternative 
interpretive mode he embraced was not functionalist in an effectiveness 
                                                                                                                          
31 Peter Spiro is a notable exception to this, though his brand of functionalism would essentially 
extend the classically formal interpretive sources (text, history, case law) to include the historical 
practice of presidential power.  Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1338, 1341 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (“[T]extual instruments cannot meaningfully alter 
an historically developed balance of interbranch powers, and . . . where the attempt is made such 
instruments will not reflect actual norms governing institutional behavior among the branches.  The 
resulting cleft between text and practice promotes the perception that war powers is a matter of politics, 
not law; this perception in turn undermines the efficacy of norms established by history and important 
to our constitutional order.”); see also Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) 
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 650, 652–53 (2002) (arguing that globalization has changed 
makeup of “international decision-making” and that historical constitutional rules need to be 
reexamined). 
32 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 6 (1993) (asserting that “the constitutional requirement that Congress express its formal 
approval before the president [sic] leads the nation into war is not remotely obsolete”); HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR 122–23 (1990); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 91 
(1992) (noting that Constitution does not assign “absolute discretion” to executive with respect to 
national security but instead delegates separate authority to both executive and legislative branches); 
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17 (1990) (challenging 
President’s constitutional authority to send forth troops); Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2000) (reasserting clear intent of Constitution to divide war power 
between executive branch and Congress); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 30 
(1991) (arguing that President Bush’s order to commence military action against Iraq in 1990 violated 
Constitution in that “Congress alone has the power to declare ‘war’”). 
33 ELY, supra note 32, at 3–10.  
34 KOH, supra note 32, at 69–70. 
35 Id. at 67–72. 
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sense, but rather an inquiry favored by some members of the Court that 
appeared only to beg the formalist question: whether the allocation of 
power to one branch infringes on the “central . . . functioning” of another 
branch.36  Thus, even as the Court looked to increasingly pragmatic 
considerations to resolve separation-of-powers disputes,37 the predominant 
functional perspectives on security largely favored broad executive power, 
or were viewed as relevant, at most, in rebuttal to the broad-executive-
power account.38   
B.  The New National Security Functionalists 
In the years since September 11th, formalist interpretation has retained 
its central place in the arguments of those advocating the protection of 
individual liberty,39 while functionalist arguments respecting national 
security matters have proliferated.  Scholars from Bruce Ackerman to Eric 
Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and John Yoo, among others, have seized upon 
functional claims in the service of advocating adjusted constitutional 
structures—enhanced executive power and limited judicial review—to 
accommodate the threat, perceived as newly acute, of terrorism and so-
called weapons of mass destruction.40  While the new functionalists 
                                                                                                                          
36 Id. at 143–44 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).   
37 See cases cited supra note 19.  
38 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185–90 (1995) (responding to arguments that 
the post World War II world “is far more dangerous and much more in need of decisive presidential 
action”); KOH, supra note 32, at 118–23, 212–18 (1990) (“Given the president’s superior institutional 
capacity to initiate governmental action, the burden of generating reactive responses to external 
challenges has almost invariably fallen on him.”). 
39 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 292 (2004) 
(noting that Constitution “allot[s] war powers to Congress and to the President”); David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and 
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) (arguing constitutional text and history 
supports active congressional engagement in presidential conduct of war); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin 
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) 
(rejecting textual and historical arguments that Vesting Clause provides broad source of inherent 
executive authority); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the 
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1266 (2002) (“[I]n the absence of an emergency that threatens 
truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution’s text, structure, and logic 
demand approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly curtailed or abridged.”); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154–55 (2004) 
(arguing that “inherent, constitutional executive detention power, particularly as invoked against U.S. 
citizens, simply does not exist”) (footnote omitted).  But cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319–22 (2006) 
(arguing formal separation-of-powers structures provided inadequate check on executive authority 
post-September 11).   
40 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3–4, 13; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 56; Yoo, supra 
note 2, at 816–21; see also HEYMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 2, at 9 (“It is the President who has the 
information and expertise necessary to detect and infiltrate terrorist networks and incapacitate terrorists. 
Having outsiders second-guessing these steps would inevitably lead to undue executive branch caution. 
In addition, trying to exercise oversight without knowing facts that must be kept secret would be 
ineffective at best. Courts, legislatures and even Inspectors General undermine confidence, move much 
too slowly and need information that they cannot safely be given. Oversight of executive actions, 
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disagree about some things, they share at least two core premises in 
common: (1) modern security threats, especially international terrorism 
and “weapons of mass destruction,” are different in kind from past threats, 
and the separation of powers of the eighteenth century Constitution is 
unlikely adequate to meet them;41 and (2) these threats put a premium on 
competencies—namely speed, secrecy, and/or unity of decision-making—
that the executive uniquely holds.42  It is in large part this new functionalist 
vision that has informed the structural constitutional interpretation invoked 
to support presidential power to torture detainees, engage in warrantless 
domestic surveillance, and, in key respects, exclude courts from ex post 
review of executive practices of interrogation, detention, and trial of 
terrorism suspects.43 
Among constitutional scholars, a relatively detailed account of the first 
proposition comes from John Yoo.  Contrasting today’s threats from those 
faced by previous American generations involving “set-piece battlefield 
matches between nation-states,” Yoo argues that post–Cold War national 
security threats feature far different challenges, such as the proliferation of 
                                                                                                                          
therefore, should lie exclusively within the operating arms of the executive branch.”). 
41 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3–4, 13–14 (arguing that modern terrorist threats are 
different than historical enemies and that “proliferation of destructive technologies” has made viable 
threats out of terrorist groups where previously only nation-states had such capability); POSNER & 
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 56 (“Our original constitutional structure, with a relatively weak 
presidency, reflects the concerns of the eighteenth century and is not well adapted to current 
conditions.”); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1027 (2003) (“The compression of time and space brought about 
by technological innovation, the communications revolution, and advancements in transportation brings 
new challenges and threats to states while significantly reducing the state’s available time for 
response.”); Yoo, supra note 2, at 813, 816–22 (arguing that “significant changes in the international 
system and the national security interests of the United States” have changed approach necessary in 
dealing with threats); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE 
OF TERROR 146–48, 152–53, 159, 163 (2004) (describing new challenges posed to “[o]ur constitutional 
commitments” by threat of mass casualty terrorism).  
42 See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 45–48, 61, 109 (emphasizing need for speed but rejecting, in 
part, unitary decision-making); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 17–18 (“There is a premium on 
the executive’s capacities for swift, vigorous, and secretive action”); Gross, supra note 41, at 1029, 
1097 (“The government’s ability to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively against a threat . . . becomes 
superior to the ordinary principles of limitation on governmental powers and individual rights.”); Jide 
Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523 (2006) 
(arguing that executive has access to greater information than legislative branch in regards to foreign 
affairs and can make more accurate security decisions). 
43 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Head of Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), at 36–37, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (“As Hamilton explained, . . . 
‘there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the 
community, in any matter essential to its efficacy.’”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting 
the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), at 6–7, 13–
14, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf (“Because of the structural advantages of the 
Executive Branch, the Founders also intended that the President would have the primary responsibility 
and necessary authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the Nation and to 
conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”). 
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“weapons of mass destruction,” the emergence of “rogue nations,” and the 
mass casualty threat posed by terrorist organizations of global reach like Al 
Qaeda. 44  Bruce Ackerman’s account similarly suggests that the threat 
posed by twenty-first-century terrorism is categorically different: 
There have always been millions of haters in the world, 
but their destructive ambitions have been checked by the 
state’s monopoly over truly overwhelming force.  Terrorists 
might assassinate a nation’s leader or blow up a building, but 
they could not devastate a great city or poison an entire 
region.  These are things that only states could do.  With the 
proliferation of destructive technologies, the state is losing 
this monopoly.45 
Curiously, while arguing that today’s world features fundamentally 
novel security threats, most new functionalists simultaneously embrace 
Hamilton’s eighteenth century assessment of the executive’s comparative 
advantages in meeting those threats.   
From the standpoint of institutional design, it seems that the 
executive branch has critical advantages over a multi-
member legislature in reaching foreign policy and national 
security decisions that are more accurate.  As Alexander 
Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 70, the executive is 
structured for speed and decisiveness in its actions and is 
better able to maintain secrecy in its information gathering 
and its deliberations: “Decision, activity, secrecy, and 
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one 
man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of 
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is 
increased, these qualities will be diminished.”46 
Characteristics of novel emergency threats have changed the policy 
needs of the United States, making “flexibility” in the powers allocated to 
the branches—especially flexibility for the President to act with secrecy 
                                                                                                                          
44 Yoo, supra note 2, at 813–20 & n.69 (citing NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002)). 
45 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 13.  Accord IGNATIEFF, supra note 41, at 147–48.  While Posner 
and Vermeule chronically disclaim any effort to assess the substantive merits of today’s threats, or the 
relative merits of the United States’ response, POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 158, they 
regularly identify favored executive programs on the merits, see, e.g., id. at 184–85 (supporting 
coercive interrogation).  Such an equivocal relationship with the substance of security policy leads the 
authors to some troublingly tautological reasoning: wars, which include the “war on terror,” are, or at 
least contain, emergencies; emergencies are, by definition, novel threats; the “war on terror” is thus, at 
least in part, a novel threat.  Id. at 18, 42.  
46 Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2523 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
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and dispatch—more important than ever before.47  Only a “unitary 
executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize 
national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other 
branch.”48  Further, unlike “ordinary policing” or other standard protective 
activities the government undertakes, “there is no general template that can 
be used for evaluating the government’s response” to an emergency 
threat.49  With no time for ex ante deliberation, and no metric for ex post 
assessments, “the executive’s capacities for swift, vigorous, and secretive 
action” are at a premium.50 
To understand how the new functionalists proceed from these premises 
to assess the merits of particular allocations of constitutional power—
regulating, for example, the deployment of military force, or the detention 
of terrorist suspects—it is helpful to recall the different species of 
functionalist approach.51  As in the administrative law context, some 
functionalist claims are based on an assessment of purposive merit.  Here, 
the question of interest is whether a particular allocation of power serves or 
disserves an asserted separation-of-powers goal—for example, ensuring 
democratic accountability.  Another species of claim entails security-based 
assessments of raw effectiveness.  Such claims ask which allocation of 
power is likely to produce more good national security outcomes than bad 
ones.  Still a third approach is a claim of role effectiveness—asking which 
branch or branches of government, in light of their given institutional 
                                                                                                                          
47 Yoo, supra note 2, at 813, 816–22; John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1183, 1200 (2004); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 
1642–43, 1676–77 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Constitutional Text]. 
48 Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 47, at 1676. 
49 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 18. 
50 Id.; see also ACKERMAN supra note 2, at 61 (“The realities of globalization, mass 
transportation, and miniaturization of weapons of destruction suggest that bombs will go off too 
frequently for the judicial cycle to manage crises effectively.”); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY 67 (2007) (describing administration’s frustration with “vague criminal laws” designed 
before advent of “the Internet, cell phones, and miniaturized weapons of mass destruction”).  Exactly 
what new miniaturization reality the authors have in mind here is less than clear.  Conventional bombs 
have fit in backpacks for decades, as have, of course, microbial biological agents.  The technology 
required to “miniaturize” a nuclear weapon is highly complex, intensely hard to come by, and for these 
and a host of other reasons, unlikely to be a terrorist group’s weapon of choice.  See Albert Narath, The 
Technical Opportunities for a Subnational Group to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, in XIV 
INTERNATIONAL AMALDI CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL SECURITY 19–32 (Rome: 
Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei, 2003) (describing serious technical complexities of crafting 
backpack-size nuclear weapons and challenging a passing report of a “suitcase” nuclear weapon stolen 
from Soviet Union as “shaky on technical and other grounds”).  The author is former director of Sandia 
National Laboratories, one of the United States’ three major nuclear weapons laboratories.  The United 
States nuclear arsenal includes such devices, and bombs of this size may or may not have been 
mastered by the Soviets.  But design challenges of developing such a small device are substantial, and 
pose significant hurdles even for the largest, most established state nuclear powers.  Unconfirmed 
reports in the 1990s suggested that the Soviets had manufactured “miniaturized” nuclear weapons, and 
that one such device had been stolen.  These reports were widely viewed as not credible by the U.S. 
security community.  See id. at 16.  
51 See supra text accompanying note 41.  
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competences, can offer the best security-appropriate decision-making 
process to meet a particular kind of security threat. 
Despite the potentially thorough set of inquiries a combination of such 
considerations would allow, the new functionalists fail in different respects 
to take them into account.  Consider a few examples.  Bruce Ackerman’s 
exploration of an “emergency constitution” for dealing with security crises 
is classically functionalist in approach—an approach Ackerman intends to 
have both purposive and effective components.52  He takes as his purposive 
interest the protection of individual liberties as a core separation-of-powers 
function.53  At the same time, he intends his emergency constitution 
provisions to be measured by their raw effectiveness—a system that does 
“everything plausible to stop a second strike” terrorist attack.54  The system 
that fits this bill, in Ackerman’s account, is one that would grant the 
executive emergency powers for a set period of time, including, but not 
limited to, expanded powers to detain people with less-than-usual process 
or review.55 
Ackerman’s purposive assessment has much to recommend it.  He 
recognizes, as had other purposive functionalists of pre–9/11 vintage, that 
protecting liberty is a core function of separated powers.56  On the 
effectiveness side, Ackerman also acknowledges, albeit in passing, the idea 
that various organizational pathologies can undermine the effectiveness of 
executive-alone decision-making.57  But along both purposive and 
effectiveness axes, Ackerman’s analysis is incomplete.  From a purposive 
perspective, he accounts for the concerns of what is almost certainly only 
one of the goals of separating powers; but other goals, such as promoting 
democratic accountability, may also have some historical and 
jurisprudential priority.58  Perhaps more problematic, Ackerman sets up 
effectiveness as a measure of the validity of his scheme, but then engages 
in no actual analysis of security needs or policy impact.  From his very 
broad position declaring that a general state of emergency will help prevent 
a second terrorist strike, to his specific interest in emergency authorizations 
of dragnets and administrative detention, Ackerman’s recommendations 
                                                                                                                          
52 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3–9.  
53 Id. at 3.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 80–87. 
56 See Barkow, supra note 12, at 1012 (“Even before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the 
Constitution provided protection for the rights of those accused of crimes through its structural 
provisions.”); Brown, supra note 12, at 1530–31 (arguing central focus of separation-of-powers 
analysis should be its structural purpose of protecting “ordered liberty”); see also Bruce Ackerman, The 
New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640, 715–26 (2000) (discussing how “the 
separation of powers protect[s] fundamental rights”).  
57 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 86–87, 119–20.  
58 See infra Part II.C.2 (“[E]nsuring that government functions remain adequately accountable to 
the electorate has long been thought of as a proper judicial concern, in the separation-of-powers context 
and out.”). 
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rely on significant substantive policy judgments, but his constitutional 
analysis leaves all effectiveness assessments assumed.  To the extent he 
does engage in empirical or policy analysis, his assertions face significant 
but unaddressed challenges in each respect.59  Having thus invited a 
sweeping revision of executive power under circumstances based centrally 
on his own functional claims of raw effectiveness, the elaborate 
“emergency constitution” mechanism only begs the question it asks—
would this emergency power help prevent a “second” terrorist attack?   
Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo take a somewhat different approach, though 
again purport to embrace both purposive and effectiveness interests in 
considering the question how the branches should share authority over the 
deployment of military force.60  Like Ackerman’s, Nzelibe and Yoo’s 
analysis is limited to examining only some measures of purposive 
functionality, albeit different measures than Ackerman’s: (1) which 
allocation of power best promotes the goal of responsiveness to the 
democratic preferences of the voters, and (2) which branch is best 
structurally designed to carry out a specific function (the interest earlier 
referred to as role effectiveness).61  As one can already discern in the 
difference from Ackerman’s focus, Nzelibe and Yoo’s purposive measures 
fail to take full account of the Constitution’s functional interests in 
dividing powers.  Indeed, their purposive assessment seems particularly 
arbitrary; neither protecting individual rights nor constraining power—
likely among the framers’ central goals62—factor into their analysis. 
Nzelibe and Yoo’s purposive account also highlights another potential 
pitfall of functional inquiry: assuming that certain features of institutional 
character are inherent to the institution, as opposed to characteristics that 
may be, constitutionally, shared or bargained away.  Thus, for example, 
Nzelibe and Yoo discount Congress’s functional effectiveness in making 
use-of-force decisions in part on the grounds that the executive is likely to 
have better or more relevant information.63  But there is nothing inherent in 
the structural constitutional design of Congress that prohibits it from 
getting independent information, or even from sharing access to 
information that the executive has; there is no constitutional barrier here, 
(and many constitutional imperatives) to such information sharing.  Lack 
of information, then, does not provide a structural reason why Congress is 
ill suited to making the decision to use force. 
As for testing war-making effectiveness, Nzelibe and Yoo select one 
particular measure of effectiveness, asking which allocation of power is 
                                                                                                                          
59 See infra Part III.A (arguing that Ackerman’s effectiveness claims are “suspicio[us] . . . when . . 
. held up against even a modest review of the open security literature”).  
60 Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2522–23. 
61 Id. at 2522–26. 
62 See infra Part II.C.1, 2. 
63 Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2522–24. 
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more likely to send appropriate or helpful signals of U.S. intent to potential 
enemies.64  The authors contend that because signaling may have more or 
less value depending on the type of enemy regime at issue—democratic 
enemies are capable of using signals to bargain away from war, terrorist or 
“rogue” authorities lack the internal political pressure required to make 
bargaining to avoid war necessary—the President should have the option 
of pursuing force without first seeking the approval of Congress (thereby 
revealing, unnecessarily, our war-making intent).65   
Nzelibe and Yoo deserve credit for making some effort to practice 
what they preach, applying a combination of rational choice theory and 
political science to evaluate the suitability of having Congress or the 
executive authorize first uses of force.  But even apart from the deeply 
questionable merits of their conclusions on empirical and other grounds,66 
their approach suffers from more fundamental flaws as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation.  Consider two examples.  First, even within 
the inherently flexible boundaries of functional separation-of-powers 
analysis, an approach that makes the availability of power solely dependent 
upon the nature of a particular external threat (including the quality of 
other governments’ internal deliberations) makes U.S. governmental 
institutions and war decision-making processes particularly unpredictable, 
subject in the first instance to the happenstance of our enemy du jour.  In 
part for this reason, the Supreme Court’s interest in efficacy in separation-
of-powers cases has been circumscribed to evaluate not simply 
effectiveness in an absolute sense, but effectiveness as internal to the 
allocation of power among the branches, with adjustments to traditional 
allocations of power “limited to that which is necessary to make” a 
particular policy work.67  The Nzelibe and Yoo effectiveness criterion 
embodies neither of these limits—limits the Court has recognized as 
centrally entwined with the rule of law.68  Their effectiveness concern—
                                                                                                                          
64 Id. at 2526–36.  The authors may be criticized for neglecting to explain why they select this one 
of the many potential metrics of effectiveness in dealing with a threat—for example, fewest American 
lives lost, fastest route to strategic victory, etc.  Arguably such other measures are much more 
instructive in testing whether or not “good” policy is being made.  But any one criterion, if rigorously 
applied, may provide at least some helpful insight into the “most effective” allocation of power.  
Selecting just this one metric might make their theory incomplete, but one must begin by attempting to 
understand whether the single metric is even partially correct. 
65 Id. at 2532–36. 
66 See Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to 
Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1251–52 (2006) (“Though the authors claim 
that ‘little or no empirical data’ supports the idea that congressional involvement leads to superior 
selection of wars, in fact a wealth of empirical information addresses the effectiveness of democracies 
in coercive bargaining and war.”). 
67 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1986) (emphasis 
added).  
68 See id. at 856–67 (“[T]his case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional 
power at the expense of a coordinate branch.”); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 
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how our enemies make decisions—will produce a different outcome case-
by-case, but their allocation of decision-making power (to the President) 
will apply even if our enemies make decisions in a way that would make 
congressional involvement beneficial (by their terms). 
Second, while the Supreme Court (and the framers) no doubt 
recognized the relevance, at times, of functional concerns both purposive 
and effective, those concerns have never been understood as the only 
factors relevant to constitutional interpretation.69  As Mssrs. Yoo and 
Nzelibe surely agree, effectiveness considerations are only part of any 
legitimate interpretation of the separation of powers.  While stand-alone 
functional inquiries in the scholarly literature can be extremely helpful 
(just as stand-alone historical or textual analyses), the reality that 
effectiveness concerns are only part of a larger scheme of constitutional 
interpretation imposes some limits on the outcomes that effectiveness may 
legitimately support.  Thus, for example, an effectiveness assessment that 
is demonstrably at odds with the Constitution’s text cannot be sustained.70 
A final new functionalist model comes from Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule.  They purport to look exclusively to role effectiveness concerns, 
particularly the question of which branch is best structurally designed to 
strike the balance between security and liberty in an emergency.  Unlike 
Ackerman, Nzelibe and Yoo, Posner and Vermeule expressly (and 
repeatedly) disclaim any interest in raw effectiveness assessments—
questions of whether or not a particular allocation of power has produced 
bad policy.71  Having put all their functional eggs in the purposive basket, 
Posner and Vermeule do better in some respects, by, for example, 
acknowledging purposive interests in both the protection of individual 
rights as well as in the allocation of power to promote role effectiveness.72  
Nonetheless, their argument encounters its own set of pitfalls.73  
                                                                                                                          
1246 (1995) (“The central characteristic of this new school is a willingness to treat even the 
architecture-defining, power-conferring provisions of the Constitution as merely suggestive—as though 
they offer teasing hints about the design of any number of possible government frameworks. . . . I 
emphatically reject any such treatment of our Constitution’s architectural provisions.  Constitutions that 
merely proclaim political aspirations, like those of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, might be 
so regarded.  Not so for constitutions that create an edifice of law.  Ours is a constitution that calls 
certain institutions into being.  Thus, we must look to that Constitution to determine how these 
institutions are to operate and when their products are to be regarded as law.”).   
69 See infra text accompanying notes 80–84. 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 78–83. 
71 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
72 Id. at 16. 
73 For example, they too confuse circumstantial characteristics of one or another branch with 
inherent features of institutional character that cannot be transmitted.  Information is not an institutional 
feature; it is a commodity that can be transferred among institutions, either by rule or by less formal 
mechanisms.  For other criticisms of the Posner and Vermeule approach, see, for example, Derek Jinks 
& Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); Mark 
Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1451, 1451 n.5 (2007).  
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Perhaps most important among these is the authors’ dismissal of raw 
effectiveness as relevant to the functional inquiry.  The problems with this 
approach become evident when one considers their given reasons for 
rejecting such a metric.  A first reason appears something like a sense of 
modesty, coupled with an asserted interest in (role effectiveness) deference 
to “the expertise of security professionals.”74 
Whether the government justifiably detains al Qaeda suspects 
without charging and trying them depends to a large extent 
on the magnitude of the threat, the importance of secrecy, and 
other factors that few people outside of government are in a 
position to evaluate. . . . [W]e have no opinion about the 
merits of particular security measures adopted after 9/11 . . . .  
Our point is that we are not well positioned to judge the 
merits of those policies, nor are the civil libertarian critics of 
those policies.75  
The second reason the authors disclaim an interest in raw effectiveness 
is itself a raw assertion of policy reality: “[E]mergency threats vary in their 
type and magnitude across jurisdictions, depending heavily on the 
geopolitical position of the state in question.  Thus, there is no general 
template that can be used for evaluating the government’s response.”76 
The problem of internal contradiction here is stark: the authors insist 
they do not know enough about emergency security decisions to evaluate 
whether such decisions are good or bad, but do know enough to claim, 
inter alia, that good responses are necessarily “swift, vigorous, and 
secretive”; that power should be concentrated in an emergency and should 
“move up from the states to the federal government”; that limiting liberties 
can enhance security; and that it is not possible generally to evaluate 
whether decisions taken in an emergency are good or bad.77  Although their 
(avowedly inexpert) opinion leads them to conclude that it is not possible 
to evaluate the effectiveness of government responses to “unique” security 
threats, the authors will need more than this assertion to explain the 
fruitlessness of such activities to the large part of the American security 
community devoted to doing just that.78 
                                                                                                                          
74 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 10. 
75 Id. at 9. 
76 Id. at 18. 
77 Id. at 15–16, 18.  Indeed, the authors regularly offer substantive evaluations of the effectiveness 
of various security decisions.  See, e.g., id. at 22 (positing their “tradeoff thesis” as idea that neither 
liberty nor security can be “maximized without regard to the other”); id. at 184–85 (supporting 
regulated use of coercive interrogation).  For a critique of this and other raw effectiveness claims made 
by new functionalists’, see Part III.A.   
78 Indeed, it is in part the regular engagement in after-action review for the purpose of gleaning 
lessons for future action that gives the security community, military and otherwise, the expertise that 
Posner and Vermeule argue is worthy of deference.  See generally CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT 
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The impact of these various omissions in the new functionalist 
approach becomes apparent when one evaluates the constitutionality of a 
specific policy such as security detention.  This example is considered 
below.79  For present purposes, it may suffice to conclude that the new 
functionalists offer a mixed bag.  On one hand, they introduce important 
purposive interests—including those of individual rights and role 
effectiveness—into the constitutional calculation.  Where formal 
methodologies produce uncertain answers to the constitutionality of 
government action, such considerations may offer useful guidance.  On the 
other hand, each considers only some among various potentially legitimate 
functional interests—and some in far greater detail than others.  And there 
is the overlaying puzzle of Hamilton’s prolonged sway on raw 
effectiveness analyses—even in a world, the new functionalists contend, of 
security interests different from those of the eighteenth century.  
Understanding how and whether to fill the gaps the new functionalists 
leave requires a theory of what role functional considerations should play 
in the constitutional law of separation of powers. 
C.  Functionalism as a Factor: Purposes and Effects 
The new functionalists are right on at least one score: there is often no 
way to avoid functional considerations when it comes to the analysis of 
separation-of-powers problems in matters of national security.  While there 
is considerable attractiveness in the idea that national security authority is 
shared amongst the branches according to established, formal 
commitments based on the nature of particular powers, the evidence seems 
overwhelming that it is rarely that simple.  For instance, the text does not 
expressly allocate to the executive any power to detain prisoners seized on 
the field of combat.  Yet it is broadly agreed that the President must have 
such power, at least to some extent, as part of any inherent or delegated 
authority to wage war.  As the Court put it recently in recognizing 
presidential authority to detain individuals captured in a zone of military 
combat: “[D]etention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a 
fundamental incident of waging war.”80  Why is detention a “fundamental 
                                                                                                                          
CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST 
DISASTERS (2007) (assessing mechanisms for improving disaster prevention); STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, 
WINNING THE NEXT WAR: INNOVATION AND THE MODERN MILITARY (1994); see also NAT’L COMM’N 
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 393–95 (2004) 
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (detailing why review is worthwhile, and what lessons have 
been gleaned).  Does the possibility of evaluation of emergency responses mean that every emergency-
related decision should be subject to searching judicial or other review, and tested against a measure of 
best-possible-response?  Not necessarily.  But it does mean that one might doubt the validity of 
rejecting all post hoc evaluation of emergency actions on the grounds that such evaluation is 
categorically impossible. 
79 See infra Part IV.  
80 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). 
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incident”?  Only functional analysis provides a complete answer.  Indeed, 
as should become clear in the discussion that follows, there is a strong 
basis in history and precedent for accepting that functional interests are 
part of the constitutional calculus.81 
This is not to say that formal considerations are irrelevant.  On the 
contrary, the Court’s analysis invariably, and appropriately, integrates such 
considerations.82  There are a number of reasons to reject the notion that 
constitutional structures are so flexible that any particular Congress and 
President may work out for themselves what power arrangement a given 
threat demands.  The powers vested in the branches by the Constitution are 
limited by something more than circumstantial effectiveness.  It is a core 
constitutional principle that ours is by law a government of limited powers, 
a principle crystallized in the textual insistence that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”83  
Accordingly, while the government as a whole may have all the power it 
needs to ensure the defense of the nation,84 the power of the President 
“must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution 
itself.”85  In part for this reason, the structural provisions of the 
Constitution—“the architecture-defining, power-conferring provisions” 
setting out the basic allocation of power among the branches—have been 
appropriately interpreted in a less circumstantially dependent way than 
provisions aimed at specified individual rights.86     
                                                                                                                          
81 See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1729–30 (1996) (“The Founders embraced separation of powers 
to further several widely agreed-upon goals.  Among these were certain ends or values that today are 
commonly at the center of separation of powers debates, including balance among the branches, 
responsibility or accountability to the electorate, and energetic, efficient government.”); see also 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 354–553 (1998); 
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
173–83 (1985) (on failures of Articles of Confederation); see also id. at 261–62 (describing framers’ 
discussion at Constitutional Convention of allocation of powers among branches and arguing that 
“theory was even less relevant, and experience itself was inadequate: they could rely ultimately only on 
common sense, their collective wisdom, and their willingness to compromise.”); see generally  
HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 71 (1981) (explaining that 
Constitution was created to ensure against “tyrannical government” and to protect liberty). 
82 See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 22, 24 (explaining that Justices have relied upon both formalistic 
and functional analysis in deciding cases). 
83 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Tribe, supra note 68, at 1247–48 (“Those provisions of the 
Constitution that are manifestly instrumental and means-oriented and that frame the architecture of the 
government ought to be given as fixed and determinate a reading as possible—one whose meaning is 
essentially frozen in time insofar as the shape, or topology, of the institutions created is concerned.”). 
84 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
86 Tribe, supra note 68, at 1246–47.  This, in contrast to, for example, the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments, where the Court has rarely engaged in foreign comparative analysis in cases involving 
the structural provisions of the Constitution.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, 
The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 905–06 (2005) (“Many clauses of the 
Constitution—for example, the Contracts Clause and the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III—have 
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What matters for interpretive purposes, then, is what the Constitution’s 
functional interests are, how they should be weighted against formal 
insights, and how to determine what allocation of powers best serves both.  
This section recommends a functionalist approach that aims to address 
gaps left by both the pure formalist and the new functionalist analyses.  For 
while opposed in many respects, the framers were united in identifying a 
core set of purposes that separating powers among the branches should 
achieve: (1) the protection of individual liberty through the constraint of 
government power; (2) the preservation of democratic accountability; and 
(3) the promotion of effectiveness—an idea that decision-making and 
effectiveness could be enhanced if the branches develop a degree of 
specialization and a level of competence lacking in the Confederation 
government.87  In understanding what role functional analysis can play in 
the national security context, it is worth briefly recalling each of these 
interests.  
1.  The Protection of Individual Rights  
It should be—but evidently is not88—beyond question that a core goal 
of dividing roles among different branches is to limit power and thereby to 
protect individual liberty.  For the framers, “remembering the many 
instances in which governments vested solely in one man, or one body of 
men, had degenerated into tyrannies, they judged it most prudent that the 
three great branches of power should be committed to different hands.”89  
Hamilton himself was one of the key proponents of this view.  As he put it: 
“The true principle of government is this—make the system complete in its 
structure, give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers 
you give it will never affect your security.”90  Hamilton thus championed 
the centrality of the balance of constitutional powers to secure the 
                                                                                                                          
not proved to be as amenable to borrowing from foreign court decisions or legal rules as the ambiguous 
and developing Eighth Amendment has proved to be.  And, while a textbook on issues of criminal law 
might be satiated with cases referring to foreign sources of law, a legal textbook on the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts or on the federal government’s separation of powers would be quite lacking in such 
references.”). 
87 Other scholars have described a similar set of interests, using somewhat different terminology.  
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 56, at 715–27 (2000) (identifying separation-of-powers goals as 
protection of fundamental rights, democracy, and professional competence); Flaherty, supra note 8, at 
1767 (identifying separation-of-powers goals of “balance,” “accountability,” and constraining 
“governmental power”). 
88 See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2519–20 (identifying promotion of effectiveness and 
political accountability—but not constraint of government authority or protection of individual rights—
as central concerns of separation-of-powers analysis). 
89 WOOD, supra note 81, at 549 & n.42; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the 
definition of tyranny.”). 
90 Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1802 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 350 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941)).  
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protection of individual rights.  While agreeing there were individual 
human rights so fundamental that no government could legitimately 
abridge them, Federalists Hamilton and Madison famously opposed adding 
the Bill of Rights to the Constitution.  A bill of rights was unnecessary in 
their view because the checks and balances of the federal governmental 
structure were themselves adequate to protect the people’s fundamental 
rights.91  Thus, in attacking the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition 
Act of 1798 (passed during the quasi war with France, criminalizing 
speech critical of the federal government), Madison’s first point of 
contention was not that the provision violated the First Amendment right to 
free speech, but rather that Congress lacked the structural authority to 
regulate the press.92 
It is thus unsurprising that the Supreme Court has regularly recognized 
the protection of individual liberty as a core purpose of separated powers—
and that it has done so even in those cases often considered formalist in 
approach.  For instance, in defending the formal requirement of 
bicameralism from executive encroachment, the Chadha Court emphasized 
the fear of tyranny that drove the framers to embrace it: “Despotism comes 
on mankind in different shapes.  Sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in 
a military, one.  Is there danger of Legislative despotism?  Theory & 
practice both proclaim it.”93  The same concern appeared with greater 
emphasis in Buckley v. Valeo, finding a violation of the Appointments 
Clause and separation-of-powers principles in an act reserving to Congress 
the power to appoint members of the executive branch Federal Elections 
Commission:  
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the 
same person or body . . . there can be no liberty, because 
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate 
should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner. . . . Were the power of judging joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
                                                                                                                          
91 Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment’s 
Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63, 68–69 (1987).  
92 Id. at 74–75. 
93 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–49 (1983) (quoting 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (1911)); see also id. at 949 (quoting Hamilton arguing against 
adopting unicameral legislature on grounds that “we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the 
most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most 
execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality 
that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to 
avert.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 135 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 
1888)); id. at 950 (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.  The 
remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, 
by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as 
the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)). 
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exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the 
legislator.  Were it joined to the executive power, the judge 
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.94   
Notably, the recognition that individual liberty is a fundamental 
purpose of the separation of powers has appeared with at least as much 
frequency in the Court’s separation-of-powers cases involving national 
security concerns as in its traditional separation-of-powers cases.95  
2.  Political Accountability 
While perhaps by comparison a marginal interest in the Court’s 
                                                                                                                          
94 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302–03 (James 
Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)) (emphasis omitted); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central 
judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of 
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”) (citing 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986)). 
95 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth of this country, 
separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”) (citing MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT 
OF THE LAWS 151–52 (T. Nugent trans.1949)); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 146–47, 269–70); 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1957) (“The Founders envisioned the army as a necessary 
institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds.”); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate 
the dispersed powers into a workable government.”); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 
(1946) (“Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government.  They 
were set up by our founders to protect the liberties they valued.”) (citing Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 19 
(1942).  The Court’s recent jurisprudence in this area has emphasized this point repeatedly:   
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers 
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such 
circumstances.  Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of 
the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention 
scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this 
approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. . . . 
Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its 
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it 
most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake. . . . [I]t would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest 
that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis 
for his detention by his Government, simply because the Executive opposes making 
available such a challenge.  
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–37 (2004) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[I]t was ‘the central judgment of the 
Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers 
into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.’”); Home Building & Loan 
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[T]he war power . . . . is a power to wage war 
successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme 
cooperative effort to preserve the nation.  But even the war power does not remove constitutional 
limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”)); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Trial by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns 
of the highest order.  Located within a single branch, these courts carry the risk that offenses will be 
defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive officials without independent review.  Concentration 
of power puts personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s 
three-part system is designed to avoid.  It is imperative, then, that when military tribunals are 
established, full and proper authority exists for the Presidential directive.”). 
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separation-of-powers jurisprudence, appearing in dissents more often than 
in majorities,96 the idea that separating powers would serve to promote the 
accountability of the government to the people is also a recognizable theme 
in constitutional history and interpretation.97  As Hamilton put it in arguing 
that the executive power should be vested in a single President, “[O]ne of 
the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive . . . is that it tends 
to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. . . . [T]he multiplication of the 
executive adds to the difficulty of detection . . . .”98  One can of course 
debate whether the highly complex executive branch of the modern 
administrative state is better or worse than the original Hamiltonian vision 
in securing the kind of accountability Hamilton had in mind.  But the basic 
claim should remain valid: promoting political accountability is a purpose 
of separated powers.  
Indeed, ensuring that government functions remain adequately 
accountable to the electorate has long been thought of as a proper judicial 
concern, in the separation-of-powers context and out.  As the Court put it 
recently: “By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch 
fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both 
effective and accountable.”99  Thus, in the administrative law context, the 
political accountability of the executive forms a significant part of the 
rationale supporting judicial deference to executive agency decisions based 
on often broad congressional authorization.100  The particular ability of the 
                                                                                                                          
96 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393–94 (determining that Sentencing Commission “does not 
exercise judicial power” and is sufficiently separate from judicial branch to maintain separation of 
powers); id. at 421–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against Congressional delegation of lawmaking 
to commissions that are not accountable to political process); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he difference is the difference that the Founders envisioned when they established a 
single Chief Executive accountable to the people: the blame can be assigned to someone who can be 
punished.”).   
97 Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1767, 1785 (“As it promised balance, separation of powers also 
reflected a reconceptualization of accountability. . . . No less important, the Constitution continued the 
recent constitutional trend of harnessing separation of powers to joint accountability.”); see also Steven 
G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42 (1995) 
(arguing that “key consideration” for unitary executive “was accountability to the electorate”); 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1994) (rejecting strong “unitary executive” theory but noting the continued salience of “important 
values of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in the execution of the laws”).  
98 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 405–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).   
99 Loving, 517 U.S. at 757.  Of course, it is not the President but Congress that is most commonly 
thought of as the most politically accountable branch.  Id. at 757–58 (“Article I’s precise rules of 
representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch 
most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking.  Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, 
designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the 
Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control.  The clear 
assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer 
for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.”) (citation 
omitted); see also Barkow, supra note 12, at 997 (noting process mechanisms designed to promote 
public accountability of executive agencies). 
100 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) 
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
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electorate to hold political actors accountable for bad (or even unlawful) 
decision-making is likewise near the center of the political question 
doctrine, which is based in part on a notion that the courts can and should 
decline to exercise jurisdiction in the interest of allowing some uniquely 
political questions to be settled by the voters.101  The importance of 
political accountability has also appeared in converse, as the Supreme 
Court has urged against constructions of criminal laws that would create a 
constitutional question by allowing Congress (and potentially the 
executive) to effectively reap the political benefit of appearing tough on 
crime without bearing the political cost.102   
It is thus perhaps ironic for the new functionalists that in the foreign 
affairs context, political accountability has been at times antithetical to the 
Court’s primary concerns.  As the Court explained in Curtiss-Wright:  
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our 
international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious 
embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our aims 
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made 
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree 
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which 
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved.103   
Put differently, foreign affairs are complicated, and may at times require 
more operational delicacy than that permitted by popular democracy full-
bore. 
Thus, even acknowledging the relevant, if indeterminate, effect of 
political accountability, it is important to keep in mind some important 
                                                                                                                          
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”). 
101 See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 323–30 (2002) (defending 
some form of political question doctrine on grounds of promoting accountability).  
102 For example, in requiring that the maximum sentence accompanying a given crime be 
provided by the legislature and proven to a jury—rather than affording judges the discretion to exceed 
the sentence provided by statutory law—the Court insisted that our democratic structures discourage 
legislatures from saying one thing while enabling the courts to do another.  Rather, a state is required 
“to make its choices concerning the substantive content of its criminal laws with full awareness of the 
consequences, unable to mask substantive policy choices” behind having adopted the underlying law in 
the first place.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n.16 (2000) (quoting Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197, 228–29 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)).  In such a way, the Court noted, 
“[t]he political check on potentially harsh legislative action is then more likely to operate.”  Id.  For a 
discussion of this argument in the context of the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions following the 
passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, see Deborah N. Pearlstein, Saying What the Law Is, 
1 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. (Online), Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/11/saying 
_what_the_law_is.html. 
103 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
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limits on its impact in separation-of-powers analyses.  First, appropriate 
government interests in secrecy surrounding certain aspects of national 
security may make it impossible for political accountability checks to 
function effectively.  Where in other realms of administrative law it may 
be plausible to argue that strong presidential engagement with agency 
decision-making enhances transparency (and therefore accountability),104 
just the opposite effect is more likely to be at work in the national security 
context.  That is, it is precisely because security sometimes requires 
secrecy that the involvement of more than one branch may be required to 
make popular accountability possible at all.105   
Second, as classic republicanism teaches, the interest in political 
accountability contemplated by the framers was something other than 
ensuring governance by pure reflection of popular will.  On the contrary, 
the prevention of tyranny was regularly valued in the Constitution’s 
structure over the idealization of direct democracy.  Popular election of the 
chief executive would be mediated by an electoral college; the risk of 
legislative demagoguery would be limited by a presidential veto; both 
“political” branches would be held in check by the judiciary’s 
constitutional review, and so on.106  Bearing far greater emphasis was that 
“[t]he true policy of the axiom [of separation of powers] is that legislative 
usurpation and oppression may be obviated.”107  Under the circumstances 
                                                                                                                          
104 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001) 
(“Presidential administration promotes accountability in two principal and related ways.  First, 
presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the public to comprehend more accurately the 
sources and nature of bureaucratic power.  Second, presidential leadership establishes an electoral link 
between the public and the bureaucracy . . . .”). 
105 This conclusion is the opposite of that reached by Yoo, who argues that executive discretion 
to, for example, deploy military force without interbranch consultation, is adequately checked by 
political accountability by the President to the electorate.  Yoo, supra note 2, at 821; see also Nzelibe & 
Yoo, supra note 42, at 2519–23.  Yoo does not address the concern that public elections may be 
ineffective in rejecting certain kinds of executive initiative if no information is publicly available about 
the full scope and nature of executive activities. 
106 See WOOD, supra, note 81, at 446–63; Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1784–85, 1804–05 (discussing 
Founders’ concerns with legislative tyranny and in distributing political accountability among the 
branches); Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism 8–10 (Inst. for Int’l Law 
and Justice, Working Paper NO. 2007/4, 2007) (describing Constitution’s republican structures).  On 
the presidential veto power, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947–48 (1983) (“The President’s role in 
the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers’ careful efforts to check whatever propensity a 
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures.”).  On 
judicial review, see especially THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick 
ed., 1987) (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited 
Constitution.  By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions 
to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto 
laws, and the like.  Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the 
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of 
the Constitution void.  Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount 
to nothing.”). 
107 4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: THE JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
208 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1903); see also MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 150, 156, 165 (describing 
framers’ reaction against state legislative tyranny of Articles of Confederation). 
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then, it seems reasonable to consider political accountability as a factor in 
purposive functionalism, but recognize that it is unlikely to be as salient—
or as clear in its consequences—as other purposive separation-of-powers 
interests in the context of national security.   
3.  The Promotion of Effectiveness 
In contrast, a third set of interests are indisputably at the core of both 
historic and modern separation-of-powers debate, and are perhaps the most 
central to the new functionalist mission.  Here, purposive and effectiveness 
species of functionalism commingle, the latter emerging as a separate but 
integral part of the purposive analysis.  That is, it is a core purpose of 
separating powers to ensure that the specialization and competence of the 
branches are used together in a way necessary to run an effective 
government (role effectiveness), and to ensure that the division of power 
leaves room for a good outcome as a matter of policy (raw effectiveness).  
This section explains why these interests constitutionally matter. The 
following Part considers how one might go about evaluating functional 
effectiveness claims in matters of national security. 
Here, it is first essential to understand what the framers’ discussions of 
executive competence were not.  There is little question, for example, that 
Hamilton believed the Articles of Confederation government, lacking in 
unitary executive control, was grossly unprepared to fight a war repelling 
foreign attack.108  Indeed, Hamilton’s contention that national defense 
“most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of 
power by a single hand,”109 was in large measure a response to the 
particular war-related incompetence of the Articles of Confederation–
model government.  From this historical motive, however, subsequent 
assertions of the nature of Hamilton’s views of effective national security 
mechanisms have elaborated rather broadly.110  Broadest of all are among 
                                                                                                                          
108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“Are we 
in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression?  We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor 
government.”). 
109 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
110 See supra Part II.B (discussing recent scholarly accounts of executive competences).  Notably, 
there are only two occasions on which a Justice of the Supreme Court has quoted the famous passage 
on secrecy and dispatch from Hamilton’s FEDERALIST NO. 70, and on both occasions it was Justice 
Thomas in dissent.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580–81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(alterations in original) (“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along 
with the necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign 
relations.  They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential 
in these domains. ‘Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.’ 
. . . The principle ‘ingredien[t]’ for ‘energy in the executive’ is ‘unity.’  This is because ‘[d]ecision, 
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more 
eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number.’”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 
471–72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)); Hamdan  v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 
2823 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Thomas was the sole justice to find that the President had inherent authority not only to detain Hamdi, 
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today’s new functionalists: “[A] unitary executive can evaluate threats, 
consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and 
energy that is far superior to any other branch.”111  At least the former two 
assertions find no support in Alexander Hamilton.   
Rather, advocates like Hamilton of the so-called unitary executive 
urged their case on the grounds, among others, that such a figure would 
bring an “energy” that had been sorely missing in the Confederation 
scheme.112  But the notion of “energy” in the executive was not energy in 
the sense of speed, activism or power per se, but energy for the purpose of 
ensuring effectiveness in government more generally.  As Hamilton 
explained: 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the 
definition of good government.  It is essential to the 
protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not 
less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the 
protection of property against those irregular and high-
handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary 
course of justice; to the security of liberty against the 
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of 
anarchy. . . . A feeble execution is but another phrase for a 
bad execution . . . .113 
Energy was a valued characteristic not solely (or even especially) 
because it was understood to enhance the executive’s security-related 
capabilities, but because it was essential to every governmental function 
the executive was assigned, including the obligation to “take care” that the 
laws are faithfully executed.  Asserting that such “energy” is uniquely 
important in national security misconstrues Hamilton; claiming “energy” in 
                                                                                                                          
but also to make “virtually conclusive factual findings” about his status, unchecked by the courts.  
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 589.  
111 Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 47, at 1676.  
112 See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1786 (“The advocates of [a unitary executive] prevailed over 
noisy opposition—primarily with the argument that a single magistrate would give the most ‘energy’ . . 
. .”) (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64–65 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1937)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”); JOSEPH 
STORY: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 767, at 546–47 (Ronald D. 
Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (“Of all the cases and concerns of government, the direction of 
war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.  
Unity of plan, promptitude, activity, and decision, are indispensable to success; and these can scarcely 
exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the power.”). 
113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis 
added); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 243 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(“Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger and to that 
prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“I believe it may 
be laid down as a general rule, that [the people’s] confidence in and obedience to a government will 
commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.”). 
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the executive requires effectively unlimited power suggests far more about 
the nature of American government than even the new functionalists would 
likely claim.  
Hamilton thus defined energy as requiring not only unity (with its 
potential for dispatch), but also “duration [in office]; an adequate provision 
for its support; and competent powers.”114  These characteristics of 
“energy” were equally as important, and in key respects tended to balance 
the idea that good executive policy was necessarily pursued swiftly and in 
secret.  For Hamilton, adequate time in office was necessary to ensure, 
among other things, that there would be time both to plan initiatives and 
time for the public to evaluate their effect.115  “[C]ompetent powers” 
likewise referred to the presidential veto, designed to protect against undue 
“haste, inadvertence, or design” in legislation—a failing in government 
Hamilton was keen to guard against.116  In this context, decision, activity, 
secrecy, and dispatch were not the mark of good security policy per se, but 
were rather qualities—lacking in the Confederation government—that 
could aid (or not) the competent execution of any sound policy.  Either 
way, the task of public administration was one that by definition engaged 
all branches of government.117  Recognizing that different branches have 
different institutional decision-making qualities—some can act faster than 
others, for example—does not presume a conclusion about when or 
whether these qualities are most effective in managing any particular kind 
of policy.  The new functionalists risk confusing institutional description 
for policy prescription.  Just because the executive can act faster than 
Congress (or the courts) in some circumstances does not mean security 
policy is always (or even generally) served by the deployment of such a 
skill.  
Properly understood as reflecting something other than the 
constitutional endorsement of particular skills for particular problems, the 
Hamiltonian interests in both raw effectiveness (good policy) and role 
effectiveness (effective execution) emerge repeatedly in the Supreme 
Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence.  On the raw effectiveness side, 
                                                                                                                          
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also 
WOOD, supra, note 81, at 350–52; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 52 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) (“We must either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive 
with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it.”); 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1097–98 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (arguing for 
unitary executive with four-year term). 
115 Richard T. Green, Alexander Hamilton: Founder of the American Public Administration, 34 
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 541, 545, 549 (noting Hamilton’s concept that executive “[e]nergy consisted of four 
elements,” and that “[t]he second element is ‘duration,’ meaning long tenure in office”) (citation 
omitted).  
116 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 418–19 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
117 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The 
Administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, 
whether legislative, executive, or judiciary . . . .”). 
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it should be apparent that the Court has never been shy about considering 
the policy efficacy of a given separation-of-powers outcome, whether in 
the security context or out.118  For instance, in the course of explaining (in 
an opinion of now questionable validity) why it was not within the judicial 
function to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus from military 
prisoners held overseas, the Court opined that such hearings “would 
hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy [and] . . . 
would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but 
with wavering neutrals.”119  While the Eisentrager Court was obviously 
concerned with the expenditure of resources (military and other) associated 
with allowing judicial review, it is unclear what factual or strategic 
analysis underpinned the Court’s conclusion that such review would, for 
example, diminish the prestige of command.  It is perhaps worth noting 
that if the Court is willing to be swayed by arguments that judicial review 
would aid the enemy, it should also logically be prepared to consider 
arguments that some enemies are most aided by the absence of such 
                                                                                                                          
118 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (“A President and those who assist 
him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to 
do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.  These are the considerations 
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.  The privilege is fundamental to the 
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”).  
Though Nixon may be perhaps more properly thought of as a formalist case—the Court’s opinion was 
structured according to its interest in identifying, and protecting, the core or essential functions of each 
branch—the case demonstrates how difficult it is to avoid the intrusion of raw effectiveness 
functionalism, even in the context of an ostensibly formal analysis.  Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 330–31 (2003) (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516) (upholding affirmative 
action policy in part on grounds that “high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders” of the United 
States military assert that, “[b]ased on [their] decades of experience, . . . a highly qualified, racially 
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide 
national security’”).  
119 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2261 (2008) (“The Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at 
Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ 
claims.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (“We think it unlikely that this basic process 
will have the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the Government forecasts.”); id. at 
535 (“What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been 
overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.”) (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 
401 (1932)); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[T]he war power “is a 
power to wage war successfully . . . .”).  While the Court’s rejection of the presidentially created 
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay was in key respects driven by its interpretation of a statutory 
command, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2790 (2006) (noting that Uniform Code of 
Military Justice requires that “the rules applied to military commissions must be the same as those 
applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable”), the extraordinarily detailed 
attention the Court gave to evaluating the practical need for the commissions’ alternative trial 
procedures should leave little question that the majority justices had constitutional separation-of-
powers concerns in mind, see Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800–01 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Trial by 
military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order . . . . Insofar as the 
‘[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures’ for the military commissions at issue deviate from court-
martial practice, the deviations must be explained by some such practical need.”) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted).  
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review.120  But either way, there can be little doubt that the raw 
effectiveness of such a scheme—what it would mean for war fighting and 
ultimate success against a defined enemy—was a factor at some level in 
the Court’s rejection in that case of a greater judicial role. 
Role effectiveness has been a more self-conscious feature of the 
Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence.  Often cited as expressing the 
classic “flexible, pragmatic” version of executive power,121 Justice Jackson 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. joined the Court in rejecting President 
Truman’s seizure of private steel mills on the eve of a major labor strike as 
beyond the President’s constitutional authority.122  Writing an opinion the 
Court continues to recognize as having established the authoritative 
framework for reviewing the scope of executive power under the 
Constitution,123 Jackson was acutely attuned to the need for judges to 
understand the separation of powers as, at least, a partial function of 
pragmatic effectiveness: 
Some clauses could be made almost unworkable, as well 
as immutable, by refusal to indulge some latitude of 
interpretation for changing times.  I have heretofore, and do 
now, give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity 
afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical 
implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire 
textualism.124   
Accordingly, Jackson believed presidential powers should be understood 
not as fixed, but as “fluctuat[ing],” depending on the activities of the other 
                                                                                                                          
120 See, e.g., Gerard P. Fogarty, Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?, 
PARAMETERS, Autumn 2005, at 54, 68, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/ 
05autumn/fogarty.pdf (“In addition to undermining the rule of law, there have been other harmful 
unintended consequences of the Administration’s policy in Guantanamo Bay: providing fuel to a rising 
global anti-Americanism that weakens US influence and effectiveness . . . and denying the United 
States the moral high ground it needs to promote international human rights in the future.  It seems 
clear that these costs have far outweighed the operational benefits that the detainee operations have 
generated.”); Jessica Stern, Al Qaeda, American Style, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A15, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (detailing Al Qaeda efforts to utilize the detainments at Guantanamo 
as propaganda and recruitment tools); Matthew Waxman, The Smart Way to Shut Gitmo Down, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4, available at LEXIS, New Library, WPOST File (arguing that “[o]n 
balance, [the use of the prison at Guantanamo Bay]—and the widespread perception that it exists 
simply to keep detainees forever beyond the reach of the law—has become a drag on America’s moral 
credibility and, more to the point, its global counterterrorism efforts,” and further proposing that 
detentions “should include periodic reviews by an independent judge of the factual bases for a 
detention, under clearly legislated standards, and meaningful chances to challenge those premises with 
the assistance of lawyers”).  This point is addressed further in Part IV, infra.  
121 See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 
106–09 (2002) (describing ways in which Court has invoked Youngstown). 
122  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
123 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The proper framework for 
assessing whether Executive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson in 
his opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.”).  
124 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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branches.125   
Jackson’s account is useful for present purposes in several respects, 
beginning with his illumination of role effectiveness, as distinct from raw 
effectiveness, concerns.  Even as Jackson purported to reject pure formalist 
separation-of-powers analysis, he also rejected the idea that raw 
effectiveness against a particular enemy alone comprises the functional 
inquiry.126  Thus in interpreting the scope of the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause, Jackson did not squarely engage the government’s argument that 
the seizure of property was “essential” to military objectives; his counter 
was indirect, to the effect that even if such seizure were essential, formal 
limitations on executive power—including the Constitution’s structural 
certainty that the civilian power shall be superior to the military—
precluded the kind of broad reading required to find the seizure validated 
by inherent authority alone.127   
What “fluctuations” there were in the scope of executive power 
depended on factors internal to U.S. constitutional democracy; presidential 
power changed not depending solely upon some assessment of the security 
imperatives presented by a particular external threat, but rather as a matter 
of the activities of the other branches.  The experience of other nations 
might be helpful in evaluating “the wisdom of lodging emergency powers 
somewhere in a modern government,” Jackson argued.128  But there was no 
clear reason—beyond convenience—why such powers had to be the 
executive’s alone.   
In the practical working of our Government we already 
have evolved a technique within the framework of the 
Constitution by which normal executive powers may be 
considerably expanded to meet an emergency. . . . In view of 
the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can 
grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly 
ample to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the 
argument that we should affirm possession of them without 
statute.129 
                                                                                                                          
125 Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
126 Compare id. at 634–35 (noting that “[t]he actual art of governing under our Constitution does 
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated 
clauses or even single Articles torn from context”), with id. at 635, 646 (rejecting notion that “power to 
deal with a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case [includes] the unarticulated 
assumption . . . that necessity knows no law,” and cautioning that “[t]he opinions of judges, no less 
than executives and publicists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s validity 
with the cause it is invoked to promote” and that “[t]he tendency is strong to emphasize transient results 
upon policies . . . and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our 
Republic”).  
127 Id. at 646. 
128 Id. at 652. 
129 Id. at 652–53. 
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As a matter of interpretive approach, Jackson’s lesson was that the 
legitimacy of power depends not as much on the competence of any one 
branch, as on the comparison between a single branch’s competence and 
the branches’ cumulative effectiveness.130   
Finally, Jackson’s opinion also highlights another feature of 
effectiveness functionalism that the new functionalists are too ready to 
underestimate: that independent or unimpeded exercise of a disputed 
power must be necessary to the achievement of an otherwise constitutional 
goal.131  Thus, although Jackson essentially ceded the President’s argument 
that maintaining steel supplies was essential to military operations, Jackson 
directly considered (and rejected) the idea that exclusive presidential 
power was the necessary structure for accomplishing that goal.132  Indeed, 
judicial evaluation of whether a structure is necessary for the achievement 
of asserted policy aims is at the heart of much of the Court’s separation-of-
powers jurisprudence.133  In the security law realm, this principle is central 
                                                                                                                          
130 Id. at 635 (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”).  
131 In separation-of-powers and non-delegation jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized that 
while separation principles do not preclude one branch from “obtaining the assistance of its coordinate 
Branches” for the fulfillment of its responsibilities, that assistance is limited to what “the inherent 
necessities of the government co-ordination” require.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)) (emphasis 
added).  In the non-delegation context, this principle appears as the justification for requiring that 
Congress provide an “intelligible principle” by which an agency may carry out congressional direction.  
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Constitution has never been 
regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will 
enable it to perform its function . . . .”) (emphasis added).  In the separation-of-powers case law, the 
notion flows from the Madisonian command of flexibility amongst the branches.  See Mistretta, 488 
U.S. at 380–82 (discussing respective interdependence and independence of three branches of 
American government); see also id. at 381 (“[T]he greatest security . . . . against a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer 
each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of 
others.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added)); Nixon v. Adm’r of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“[T]he proper inquiry 
focuses on the extent to which [the Act in question] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing 
its constitutionally assigned functions.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (upholding 
congressional delegation of investigative powers to Federal Election Commission on grounds that such 
power has long been “regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to 
legislate—indeed, was treated as inhering in it”).  
132 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645–46. 
133 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1986) 
(finding “demonstrated need” for delegation of associated adjudicative powers to agency court and 
cautioning that “the CFTC’s assertion of counterclaim jurisdiction is limited to that which is necessary 
to make the reparations procedure workable”); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 
(1988) (finding that Court “simply [did] not see how the President’s need to control the exercise of [the 
independent counsel’s] discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require 
as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President”); Schor, 478 
U.S. at 856 (“It was only to ensure the effectiveness of this [otherwise constitutional reparations] 
scheme that Congress authorized the CFTC to assert jurisdiction over common law counterclaims.  
Indeed, . . . absent the CFTC’s exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations procedure 
would have been confounded.”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“Rather, in 
determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper 
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in decisions such as Ex Parte Milligan and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, in 
which the Court evaluated and rejected claims of military necessity for the 
suspension of civilian judicial processes.134  Thus, contrary to the new 
functionalist notion that government powers must be understood to permit 
that “everything plausible” be done to prevent another attack,135 
functionalist analysis would require (only) that the structural arrangement 
be able to accomplish everything necessary for government to be effective.  
*        *        * 
The new functionalists make an important contribution by insisting 
upon the constitutional relevance of the purpose and effect of distributing 
power.  But while functionalist concerns were indeed engrained in the 
constitutional idea, so were the limits of this idea.  The first limit is that 
formal commitments matter.  Accordingly, even legitimate functional 
concerns must fail if they are demonstrably inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s text.  A second limit is the range of relevant functional 
concerns—a defined set of interests in which the protection of liberty sits 
at the top of a hierarchy, political accountability sits beneath, and the raw 
and role effectiveness of single-branch action matter in defining the 
margins of allocations of power among the branches.  Finally, while 
effectiveness in its various forms is an appropriate consideration in 
separation-of-powers questions, nothing in the Hamiltonian vision per se 
supports the new functionalist premise that the best response to any given 
national security threat requires secrecy and dispatch, much less the notion 
that particular initiatives like security detention are worthwhile.  In the end, 
history and precedent have helped define the scope of purposive 
functionalism.  But for the effectiveness inquiries, something more is 
required.   
III.  REASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS 
In the terms just described, there is nothing inherent in the nature of 
functional analysis that should point in one direction or another in 
resolving a separation-of-powers dispute, even in the national security 
                                                                                                                          
inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its 
constitutionally assigned functions.  Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then 
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712–13 
(1974) (rejecting President’s separation-of-powers argument that judiciary lacks power to subpoena 
tapes on grounds that such a restriction would “gravely impair” courts’ ability to do their jobs). 
134 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (“It is difficult to see how the safety of 
the country required martial law in Indiana.  If any of her citizens were plotting treason, the power of 
arrest could secure them, until the government was prepared for their trial, when the courts were open 
and ready to try them.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 328–35 
(1946) (Murphy, J., concurring) (reiterating assertions of Court that military trials are constitutionally 
inappropriate under circumstances where civilian courts remain intact and open). 
135 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
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context.  The protection of individual liberty is and has ever been at the 
core of the judicial role.  Ensuring the government remains adequately 
accountable to the electorate is of course an important job of the political 
branches, but has likewise long been thought of as a proper subject of 
judicial policing and concern.  Furthermore, while the Court might at times 
demur about its interest in policy or institutional effectiveness, its 
occasional bouts of modesty on such questions belie a long track record of 
caring deeply.  What Hamilton wanted—and what the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence bears out—was a government whose cumulative skill set 
makes effective governing possible.  Yet while balancing purposive 
interests, like protecting liberty and promoting political accountability, is 
familiar terrain for legal scholars, it is perhaps less clear how government 
should work to ensure that the division of power promotes good policy 
(raw effectiveness), and carries out whatever policy it chooses effectively 
(role effectiveness).  How, then, can we determine what structural 
arrangement is most effective for a particular security policy goal? 
Here it becomes necessary to return the theoretical discussion back to 
the present context.  The new functionalists believe that the threat of 
terrorism is best addressed by various measures geared toward expanding 
executive power to exploit essential executive competencies of secrecy, 
unity, speed, information and expertise in pursuing programs from security 
detention to the use of military force.  In particular, while it is now clear 
that the modern threat of terrorism can take many forms—from car bombs 
to airline hijackings to whatever imagination can conjure—the concern that 
terrorists might successfully deploy a “weapon of mass destruction” 
(WMD) on U.S. soil appears to be the new functionalists’ greatest 
concern.136  While the new functionalist project has plain implications for 
constitutional structures—and indeed would apply their constitutional 
analysis—in a wide swath of “national security”-related matters arising in 
circumstances far removed from (for example) the days surrounding a 
successful nuclear attack, the new functionalists at times suggest they are 
interested only in such immediate pre- and post-attack circumstances.137  
As Ackerman contemplates: “Terrorist attacks may kill a hundred thousand 
                                                                                                                          
136 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 61; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 42–43; Nzelibe & 
Yoo, supra note 42, at 2535; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive 
Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671, 700, 707 (2006) (concluding that coercive 
interrogation techniques, although morally reprehensible, are justified by their potential benefits in 
preventing catastrophic terrorist attacks which are no longer trivial post–September 11th); A. John 
Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1227, 1230–31 
(2006) (“Time [is] of the essence when weapons of mass destruction have proliferated beyond the 
control of national governments.”). 
137 Compare ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 1–6, 86–87 (focusing on structural demands in 
immediate aftermath of terrorist attack), with POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 42 (suggesting 
entire “war on terror”—a term they do not define—is an emergency situation).  Nzelibe and Yoo 
suggest no such “emergency” limitation.  Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2516–19.  
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at a single blow, generating overwhelming grief and rippling panic . . . .”138  
What kind of structure for, say, security detention would we want then?  
Posing the question so specifically is not to say that these authors 
necessarily exclude from their analysis the danger of more conventional 
terrorist attacks.  But there is some logical basis for treating the WMD 
“emergency” threat separately (and not only to make the analytic task more 
manageable).139  There is a relevant substantive distinction between 
government responses to, for example, the threat of car bombings, and 
responses geared toward preventing an attack that actually threatens 
destruction on the scale Ackerman has in mind.  Conventional car 
bombings, while devastating for those involved, pose no existential threat 
to American society.  On the contrary, it would take a truly radical 
escalation of the use of such devices—far beyond the numbers in Israel or 
Northern Ireland at the height of those states’ bouts of high-level terrorist 
activity—for their domestic use to begin to reach the number of annual 
deaths domestically caused by, for example, alcohol-related car 
accidents.140  But there is no serious discussion, for example, of 
                                                                                                                          
138 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 4; see also POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 64 (positing 
that “[a]fter the terrorist attack or military intervention, [government officials’] complacency is 
replaced by fear,” but that “fear-inspired decisions” are not necessarily bad); Nzelibe & Yoo, supra 
note 42, at 2532–35 (suggesting that “new threats to American national security change the way we 
think about the relationship between the process and substance of the warmaking system”). 
139 Security scholars have been right to point out that the phrase “weapons of mass destruction” is 
obfuscatory at best.  E.g., Chistopher F Chyba, Toward Biological Security, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 123 
(May–June 2002).  Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons—the major categories 
typically included as among “WMDs”—are all, of course, dangerous.  But each such weapon poses a 
very different kind of threat from the others—including differences in raw destructive capacity—
differences that can matter significantly in crafting effective defenses.  Where policy priorities might be 
sensibly set according to some calculation of risk—a function of destructive capacity and the 
probability of a successful attack—lumping these diverse weapons together as WMDs can badly skew 
the security priority setting.  Thus, the security concerns surrounding a nuclear-armed Iraq, for 
example, might be reasonably understood as of a different order than the security concerns posed by an 
Iraq armed with chemical weapons alone.  See JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., DEADLY ARSENALS: 
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL THREATS 3 (2d ed. 2005) (“Chemical weapons are easy to 
manufacture, but they inflict relatively limited damage over small areas and dissipate fairly quickly.”).  
More to the point, lumping these threats together pretends that each demands more or less the same 
kind of defense.  This Article’s focus on the nuclear threat—certainly one of the truly “mass” threats 
among WMD’s—avoids this complication.  The “mass” destructive capacity inherent in a successful 
nuclear detonation not only threatens a great loss of life, it may also pose a more existential threat to 
society itself.  The U.S. government will continue to function at some level if a car bomb goes off 
outside the White House.  Without significant advance planning, it is not clear that basic functions can 
be maintained if the city of Washington, D.C., is lost.  If ever a government were to be justified in 
seeking extraordinary powers, it would be preventing just such destruction. 
140 In Northern Ireland, approximately 61 people were killed as a result of car bombs at the height 
of the conflict there in 1972.  MALCOLM SUTTON, BEAR IN MIND THESE DEAD: AN INDEX OF DEATHS 
FROM THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND 1969–1993 (1994).  In Israel, approximately 249 people were injured 
and 43 killed as a result of 22 car bomb incidents between 2001 and 2004.  If one adds all suicide 
attacks in Israel during that period (including attacks on buses, etc.), the numbers rise to 4551.  ISRAELI 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUICIDE AND OTHER BOMBING ATTACKS IN ISRAEL SINCE THE 1993 
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian 
+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm.  By comparison, in 
the United States in 2006, there were an estimated 17,602 alcohol-related traffic deaths, approximately 
 
 2009] THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 1589 
indefinitely detaining “known” alcoholics or drug addicts who refuse to 
seek treatment because of the high likelihood that they will kill innocents 
once behind the wheel of a car.  Indeed, such an approach would seem 
unthinkably inconsistent with the idea of a free society.  It is at least 
somewhat more difficult to identify a rational distinction between 
preventive detention geared toward suspected alcoholics, and a regime for 
suspected car-bomb terrorists.   
There are certainly disadvantages in considering such a specialized 
case in the hope of better understanding structural effectiveness.  
Government decision-making structures must obviously be able to operate 
regularly and effectively against a range of threats, and a structure that may 
offer significant benefits against a certain kind of threat may carry 
significant burdens in response to another kind of threat.  But that reality 
should make the nuclear terrorism case a particularly tough and instructive 
example.  If the nuclear case doesn’t require more separation-of-powers 
challenging structures than detention schemes designed for other kinds of 
threats, then one might legitimately question what would. 
The inquiry thus framed, this Part proceeds as follows.  The first 
section considers the new functionalists’ empirical effectiveness questions, 
holding up new functionalist conclusions about raw and role effectiveness 
against the empirical literature to test the plausibility of their assumptions 
about the terrorist nuclear threat, and the government response necessary to 
address it.  In this way, we might take another cut at evaluating whether 
their interpretive approach to effectiveness functionality has succeeded.  
The second section then sketches a different approach to assessing what 
structures might be best suited to govern detention operations in this 
context.  This section explores what there is to be learned from the work of 
organization theorists, who have studied a range of government approaches 
to the management of chronic and acute security threats, identifying both 
organizational pathologies and strengths in such approaches that bear 
directly on the kind of security detention operations often contemplated in 
current debates.  From these lessons, this Article proposes a set of 
characteristics that a decision-making structure in this context would 
ideally possess.  
A.  New Functionalist Effectiveness 
Despite the authors’ self-effacing assertions of modest knowledge in 
matters of security, raw effectiveness claims feature centrally in the new 
functionalists’ constitutional analysis.  For example: the threat of mass 
                                                                                                                          
forty-one percent of the 42,642 total traffic fatalities.  NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2006 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNUAL ASSESSMENT:  A PREVIEW (2007), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/ 
810791.PDF.   
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casualty terrorism is best understood as an emergency or war; one can 
expect that in the event of a major attack, the public will panic and need to 
be reassured through visibly different security measures (such as 
widespread detention); an initial terrorist strike greatly increases the 
probability of a second, and inadequate detention (or excessive review) 
gives “aid and comfort” to the enemy or more directly, allows a second 
strike to happen; and the uncertainty created by review imposes a burden 
on security efforts that necessarily exceeds any security benefit.141   
Yet grounds for suspicion of such conclusions become apparent when 
these core claims of “how things are” are held up against even a modest 
review of the open security literature.  In the first instance, for example, it 
is not at all obvious that government decision makers should conceive of 
the challenge of preventing nuclear terrorism as exclusively or even 
primarily a subject of “emergency” powers or emergency decision-making.  
National security scholars and policymakers have been occupied with the 
possibility that non-state actors, including international terrorist 
organizations, would seek to acquire and use a nuclear weapon against the 
United States for more than thirty years.  A 1977 report by the U.S. Office 
of Technology Assessment commissioned by Congress on questions of 
how “non-state groups [could] obtain nuclear weapons and the routes they 
could follow in doing so” concluded that “there is a clear possibility that a 
clever and competent group could design and construct a device which 
would give a significant nuclear yield.”142  While the unclassified study 
unearthed no evidence at the time that a non-state group had attempted to 
acquire a nuclear weapon, analysts cautioned that “[t]he expansion of 
nuclear power, the advent of plutonium recycle, and trends towards 
increased violence could lead non-state adversaries to attempt large-scale 
nuclear threats or violence.”143  Based on the growing prevalence of such 
analyses in the mid-1970s, the United States established the federal 
Nuclear Emergency Search Team—a professionally diverse body that still 
exists today within the Department of Energy—to support the FBI in any 
effort to locate and disable a terrorist nuclear device in the United States.144  
                                                                                                                          
141 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 46; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 254–56; JOHN YOO, 
WAR BY OTHER MEANS 128–29 (2006). 
142 U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, at iii, 30 
(1977), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7705/770501.PDF [hereinafter OTA 
REPORT]; see also JOHN MCPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY (1974) (detailing threat of nuclear 
terrorism); Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Nuclear Terror, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar.–Apr. 2002, 
at 38, 39–43 (citing 1963 national intelligence estimate called The Clandestine Introduction of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction into the U.S. and describing series of meetings in 1972 hosted by then 
Chair of U.S. Atomic Energy Commission regarding prospect of terrorist attempts to steal weapons-
grade material to make bomb for use against United States). 
143 OTA REPORT, supra note 142, at 26; see also id. at 30 (describing methods terrorist group 
could use to acquire fissile material, including theft and black market economy). 
144 NAT’L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SUPPORT 
TEAM, available at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/FactSheets/NEST.pdf.  The Atomic Energy Act 
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Such agencies have now existed with confirmation for more than a decade 
that at least one terrorist group is interested in making just such an 
attempt.145     
There have indeed been developments that make some aspects of these 
threats today arguably even easier to realize—the proliferation of weapons-
grade materials perhaps is first among them—but the danger of nuclear 
terrorism is unquestionably a threat for which we have substantial strategic 
warning.  Given the amount of warning we have had to develop prevention 
and crisis management plans, and the number of points in the process of 
weapon acquisition and deployment at which intervention is possible,146 we 
may fairly expect prevention efforts to be ongoing and indefinite.  If a 
nuclear bomb is delivered to the Port of Los Angeles, it may be preceded, 
if we are fortunate in a way few security experts anticipate, by a short-lived 
tactical crisis.  But it will not be a strategic “surprise” (an aspect of most 
new functionalists’ definitions of emergencies).147   
In any case, disaster experience provides important reason to pause 
before embracing the raw effectiveness expectation that a nuclear 
“emergency”—the event of a successful terrorist attack—will produce the 
public consequences they anticipate.  There can be no question that such an 
attack on an American city would be devastating in many ways and put 
special strains on government abilities at every level.  But contrary to 
Ackerman’s central claim that an “emergency constitution” is necessary 
because terrorist strikes generate “mass panic,” undermining “effective 
sovereignty,” 148 the social science literature provides substantial evidence 
                                                                                                                          
charges the FBI with investigating illegal nuclear activities within the United States, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2011, 2271(b) (2000), and recent Presidential Decision Directives designate the FBI as the lead federal 
agency in charge of terrorist response inside the United States.  See NAT’L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN., 
supra (“Under this national policy, the FBI is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for terrorism response 
within the United States . . . .”). 
145 Both the 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, and the later, officially sponsored report of the special 
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION (the bipartisan Silberman–Robb Commission), describe in some detail U.S. 
knowledge of Al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon.  Osama bin Laden has called the pursuit 
of a nuclear weapon a “religious obligation;” surveillance of Al Qaeda communications has revealed 
references to bringing about a “Hiroshima” in the United States; and materials found on computers in 
Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan have contained extensive materials on nuclear weapons, including 
rough sketches of bomb designs.  9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 380; Matthew Bunn & 
Anthony Weir, The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism, 104 CURRENT HIST. 153, 154 (2005) available 
at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunnwier.pdf.  Today, there seems little dispute that Al 
Qaeda has the motive to acquire such a weapon, and would deploy it if acquired.  The latter conclusion, 
however, leads most to believe that Al Qaeda and associated groups have not yet successfully acquired 
a single nuclear weapon.  COMMISSION ON INTELLEGENCE CAPABILITIES OF UNITED STATES 
REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 272 (2005), available at 
http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf [hereinafter WMD COMMISSION REPORT]. 
146 See infra text accompanying note 162. 
147 See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 42 (defining “full-blown” emergency as 
typified by “[n]ovel threats, heightened public concern, and deaths arising from hostile attacks”) 
(emphasis added). 
148 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 41–45, 89. 
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to support the opposite expectation: “widespread panic is not the pattern 
following any type of disaster.”149  Moreover, as discussed below, to the 
extent public uncertainty is a risk, the public may well be most reassured 
by a visible government commitment, not to new and uncommon 
emergency powers, but to familiar modes of operation (or as close to 
familiar as possible) already widely accepted as legitimate.150  More simply 
put, the impression and reality of control and normalcy may well be 
helpful in mitigating the risk of panic.     
An analogous set of real-world examples undermines a second core 
aspect of the new functionalist effectiveness analysis: the “tradeoff 
thesis”—so named by Posner and Vermeule, and assumed by other new 
functionalists.  This approach posits as the central concern of government 
institutions engaged in counterterrorism the functional necessity of making 
quick, zero-sum trade-offs between security and liberty.151  But it is not 
hard to find an identifiable set of circumstances in which the performance 
of this function is at best irrelevant and at worst, counterproductive, in 
counterterrorism operations.  For example, the principle recommendations 
of the vast majority of reports in the security literature about how to 
prevent or cope with a nuclear terrorist attack are uniform in proposing a 
range of rights-neutral measures. There are many recommendations in 
which executive-branch-only secrecy is not an option (for example, 
because of the necessary cooperation of foreign civilian research reactor 
personnel), and in which expertise beyond mere political judgment is 
required (for instance, to evaluate the efficacy of fissile security 
measures).152  Why such a broad area of rights-neutral consensus?  
                                                                                                                          
149 LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE 179 n.54 (1999) (“The pattern, in fact, is one of terror, 
accompanied by a moment of stunned reflection, or even anomie, followed by fairly orderly response.  
Even in the horrors chronicled by the [U.S.] Strategic Bombing Survey [established in 1944 to study 
the effects on cities in World War II devastated by firestorms and, later, nuclear attacks], cities burn, 
bodies explode, houses fall down and still people do not panic.”) (citations omitted); see also Lee 
Clarke, Panic: Myth or Reality?, CONTEXTS, Fall 2002, at 21, 22 (“After five decades studying scores 
of disasters . . . one of the strongest findings is that people rarely lose control.”); E.L. Quarantelli, 
Sociology of Panic, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
11020, 11021 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (some researchers believe that panic 
behavior “is very meaningful and far from most conceptions of irrationality”); Kathleen Tierney, 
Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9/11, in 
TERRORISM AND DISASTER: NEW THREATS, NEW IDEAS, RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 33, 34 (Lee Clarke ed., 2003) (suggesting that notion of widespread panic after disaster is a 
“myth”); see generally WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM (Alan O’Day ed., 2004). 
150 See Caron Chess, Organizational Theory and the Stages of Risk Communication, 21 RISK 
ANALYSIS, 179, 183 (2001) (discussing how social actors function better in predictable situations). 
151 ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 114–15 (assuming that emergency measures will curtail 
fundamental rights); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 26–27 (presenting supply-demand graph 
of “security-liberty frontier,” on which “any increase in security will require a decrease in liberty, and 
vice versa”); see also id. at 21 & n.7 (labeling this concept “The Tradeoff Thesis”); Julian Ku & John 
Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive 
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 218 (2006) (“In wartime the government may reduce the 
individual liberties of even citizens in order to more effectively fight the war . . . ”). 
152 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 380–81 (recommending cooperative 
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Here the analysis is usefully informed by a brief detour through some 
highly public facts.  The nuclear physics required to understand how to 
build a crude nuclear bomb has been in the public sphere for decades.153  
Experts thus agree that it is less the technical challenge of basic design and 
more the mechanical task of obtaining enough nuclear material to fuel a 
nuclear explosion that remains a critical hurdle for terrorist groups.154  The 
simplest available bomb designs use “highly enriched uranium” (HEU) as 
nuclear fuel.155  HEU is not generally available.156 Rather, there are three 
commonly understood ways to get it: (1) subject naturally occurring 
uranium to an industrial “enrichment” process that makes it suitable for 
weapons use; (2) steal it from an existing warhead; or (3) obtain it by theft 
or black market sale from an existing HEU stockpile (stockpiled either for 
not-yet-built or decommissioned nuclear weapons, or to fuel research 
nuclear reactors, or ship or submarine reactors).157  For various reasons, 
terrorist groups seem rationally far less likely to pursue or succeed in 
                                                                                                                          
international measures); WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 527–32 (recommending 
measures for several branches of government); GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE 
ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE 143–56 (2004) (recommending measures to prevent 
availability of nuclear material to terrorists worldwide); MATTHEW BUNN & ANTHONY WEIR, 
SECURING THE BOMB 2006, at 121–37 (2006), available at www.nti.org/securingthebomb 
(recommending a collaborative global response to combat nuclear proliferation); Linton F. Brooks, 
Toward an Integrative Approach to Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, in ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE 
AFTER FIFTY YEARS? 104, 105–06 (Joseph F. Pilat ed., 2007) (emphasizing the importance of securing 
nuclear materials against theft and sabotage, and enhancing export controls and treaty regimes); 
Richard A. Falkenrath, Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism, SURVIVAL, Autumn 
1998, reprinted in WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM 91, 106–09 (Alan O’Day ed., 
2004) (“[T]he single best possible insurance policy against the risk of nuclear terrorism is to ensure that 
all stockpiles of fissile (especially HEU) and nuclear weapons themselves are properly accounted for 
and guarded.”); Laura S.H. Holgate, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, in ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE 
AFTER FIFTY YEARS? 111, 111–12 (Joseph F. Pilat ed., 2007) (advocating a “global cooperative 
effort”). 
153 For instance, The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb, 
based on the original lectures given by a chief U.S. nuclear weapons scientist to a team of U.S. 
scientists working in top secret at Los Alamos National Laboratories during World War II, was 
declassified in the 1960s.  ROBERT SERBER, THE LOS ALAMOS PRIMER: THE FIRST LECTURES ON HOW 
TO BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB 25–28 (1992) (addressing, inter alia, how big bomb would need to be in 
order to achieve critical mass); see also Andrew O’Neil, Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: How Serious Is the Threat?, 57 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 99 (2003), reprinted in WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM 1, 3 (Alan O’Day ed., 2004) (“Those who maintain that nuclear 
weapons are accessible for terrorist groups point out that knowledge on ‘how to build a bomb’ is now 
freely available to anyone who has Internet access.”).  
154 See, e.g., WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 517 (“The single greatest hurdle to a 
terrorist’s fabrication of a nuclear device is the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material.”).   
155 See RICHARD L. GARWIN & GEORGES CHARPAK, MEGAWATTS & MEGATONS: THE FUTURE OF 
NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 313 (2001).  
156 See id. at 313–14 (discussing challenges of HEU production). 
157 See, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 152, 61–86 (2004) (discussing pathways for terrorists to acquire 
nuclear weapons or fissile material); BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 3–5 (discussing paths by which 
terrorists might acquire and use a nuclear weapon).  These three pathways, still the predominant 
understanding today, are essentially identical to those identified by OTA researchers in 1977.  OTA 
REPORT, supra note 142, at 30. 
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options one or two.158  On the other hand, the theft or illicit trafficking of 
material from HEU stockpiles is a substantial risk.  HEU (or weapons-
usable plutonium) is known to exist in at least forty different countries 
worldwide, in both government and civilian facilities with widely varying 
security protocols to guard against both outside attack and insider 
threats.159  Indeed, state-owned sites in the former Soviet Union have in the 
past fifteen years experienced thefts of limited amounts of HEU from 
nuclear weapons labs and reactor facilities; some of the thefts or planned 
thefts have resulted in prosecutions, largely of weapons lab or military 
insiders motivated by the prospect of profiting from the subsequent sale.160 
Nuclear research reactors (roughly 135 locations worldwide—a number at 
universities) are also thought to be prime targets, as many of these have 
existed with little security for decades.161   
In short, the threat of nuclear terrorism is in the first instance the threat 
of illicit trafficking or theft from one of the known facilities capable of 
producing such material, or stockpiles of such material.  For this reason, 
the wide assortment of official and expert recommendations regarding the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation (unrelated to bureaucratic organization) 
place top priority on urging greater international cooperative efforts to 
inventory, secure, deter, and track the disposition of these materials.162  
                                                                                                                          
158 The facilities needed to manufacture HEU are large, expensive, technically challenging to 
build, and harder to hide from existing means of state and international surveillance.  Chyba, supra note 
139, at 124–25.  Likewise, state-owned nuclear weapons tend to be protected by more or less 
sophisticated layers of defense.  U.S. nuclear weapons, for example, cannot be detonated without codes 
to so-called “permissive action links”—electronic locks requiring the correct entry of complex codes, 
substantially inhibiting unauthorized use of the weapon.  See, e.g., BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 
47 (describing various U.S. security measures); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY: 
ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 106 & n.149 (1993).  While the other nuclear 
weapons states may have less effective methods of protecting existing warheads, less is known about 
the scope of these security systems.  BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 47.  Despite this, as of 2005, the 
best publicly available analysis found that there were “no credible reports” of weapons having been 
stolen from “vulnerable” countries.  WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 272.  The 
availability of such protections does not guarantee that terrorists will not attempt weapon theft, but they 
do make this pathway less attractive than option three—theft or illicit purchase of HEU alone. 
159 BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 19.  Various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations track worldwide inventories of HEU.  See, e.g., id. at 19–20 nn.42–43. 
160 Id. at 10. 
161 Id. at 19–20 & n.43.  
162 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 380–81 (making three recommendations to 
guard against WMD proliferation: “work with the international community to develop laws and an 
international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and 
prosecution” of nuclear smugglers; expand U.S. engagement with international partnerships using 
military, economic and diplomatic tools to interdict shipments of concern, including expanding partners 
to include Russia and China; expand 1991 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and related efforts in 
partnership with Russia to secure fissile and related materials in former Soviet Union); WMD 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 527 (recommending, inter alia, that United States pursue 
“additional bilateral ship-boarding agreements” to help tag, track and locate vessels of proliferation 
concern); see also, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 152, at 143 (emphasizing the importance of persuading 
every nuclear weapons state to improve security of nuclear weapons and material); Linton F. Brooks, 
supra note 152, at 104–07 (describing cooperation with Russia, inter alia, as a “first-order priority”); 
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There may be many policy trade-offs associated with such an approach.  
But a trade-off between individual rights and security is not one of them. 
Consider another core raw effectiveness assertion: too much 
independent review of executive detention will give aid and comfort to the 
enemy, or otherwise increase security risk.  The assumption that it would is 
far from obvious.  At least some case studies of law enforcement and 
intelligence efforts in emergency settings tend to support the greater 
effectiveness of retail, rather than wholesale (or dragnet-type) efforts, in 
part because ordinary resources are so taxed already.163  And while review 
of any given detention decision (at any stage) no doubt consumes some 
resources, it has also become clear, for example, that the absence of 
judicial review for terrorist suspects (in the individual case and in the 
aggregate) may badly undermine the international support recognized as 
essential to identify and track the source of a nuclear bomb.164  In this 
                                                                                                                          
BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 121–37 (recommending various U.S. security measures).  Congress 
recently authorized substantial new expenditures for this purpose.  50 U.S.C. § 2921 (2008) (“It shall 
be the policy of the United States . . . to eliminate any obstacles to timely obligating and executing the 
full amount of any appropriated funds for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in order to 
accelerate and strengthen progress on preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation 
and terrorism.  Such policy shall be implemented with concrete measures, such as those described in 
this title . . . . As a result, Congress intends that any funds authorized to be appropriated to programs for 
preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism under this subtitle will be executed in a timely manner.”). 
163 See Arie Perliger & Ami Pedahzur, Coping with Suicide Attacks: Lessons from Israel, 26 PUB. 
MONEY & MGMT. 281, 282 (2006) (emphasizing importance of “selective” prevention procedures).  
Indeed, history provides at least several examples of wholesale emergency dragnets that create more 
problems than they solve.  See, e.g., David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency 
Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1755 (2004) (describing why “there are no mass 
preventive detention success stories in our history”).  Notably, publicly available descriptions of the 
FBI’s role in TOPOFF3—one in the U.S. Government’s series of comprehensive terrorism attack 
simulations—suggest that the FBI had at least some (and perhaps complete) success in converting pre-
attack intelligence into individual arrests, carried out by standard search warrants.  See STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT TOPOFF 3 AFTER-ACTION REPORT 8, available at http://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/ 
publicinfo/cttopoff3_pub_after_action_report_summ.pdf.pdf (“Over a period of several weeks, the FBI, 
as well as the State and Local Police Departments, were given some intelligence prior to TOPOFF 3, in 
an effort to test intelligence sharing.  It was clear that the information received by the respective 
agencies was shared and notionally successful search warrants and arrests were made prior to TOPOFF 
3.”); Department of Homeland Security, Transcript of Background Briefing with Senior DHS Officials 
on TOPOFF 3, at 8–9 (April 8, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_ 
release_0656.shtm (“[W]e had lots of information that kind of highlighted the fact that we had some 
numerous individuals of concern operating in different locations throughout the northeast United 
States, and FBI, working in partnership with state and local law enforcement, were able to follow some 
investigation—investigative leads where we were actually able to make some arrests of some 
individuals that had information dealing with other plotlines . . . . So we were able to prevent, or able to 
grab some people, able to grab some weapons, able to grab some information that we believe allowed 
us to successfully thwart a couple of events during the week or two prior to the actual full-scale events 
on Monday, and some actors that, of course, did not come up in the information surge associated with 
those activities, so that we had to deliberately build those in so we could get first responder play during 
the full-scale event . . . . In terms of activities in the United States, we believe that all individuals that 
were associated with the plotlines that were able to follow through the buildup phase and then into the 
boots on the ground phase of the exercise, we policed up the individuals, the sprayer devices, the 
suspect vehicles in question.  We were able to do that . . . .”).   
164 A remarkable study by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British Parliament 
found widely reported U.S. practices of kidnapping and secretly imprisoning and torturing terrorist 
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regard, ensuring one’s decision-making structure can evaluate, for 
example, strategic/tactical trade-offs may be at least as important as 
ensuring that the structure can evaluate liberty-security trade-offs.   
None of this is to say that a trade-off between rights and security may 
never be required.  On the contrary, there remain examples of where just 
such a trade-off may be necessary—in the bioterror context, for instance, 
with the need for quarantine following the release of an identified 
contagious pathogen.165  The foregoing is intended instead to illustrate 
three points.  First, even a modest engagement with the empirical literature 
demonstrates that it is a raw effectiveness mistake to assume an absolute 
correlation between rights and security, or that effectiveness in the task of 
quickly balancing rights and security should take priority in structural 
design.  Any raw effectiveness approach then, at least at the level of 
theory, would seem to require a more forthright engagement in what can be 
known about the real-world effects on policy of a given distribution of 
power.  It may be that raw effectiveness in any given case is not salient for 
purposes of judicial review because there is no generalizable answer, or 
because other formal or functional interests are dispositive.  But publicly 
knowable facts may make it possible to conclude that some security 
judgments with liberty implications are likely ineffective, or even 
irrational.166  If confronted with factual uncertainty about whether a 
particular decision-making structure will aid the enemy, it would be a 
peculiar constitutional disservice to assume, purely on raw effectiveness 
grounds, a singular conclusion nonetheless.   
Second, as should be evident by, for example, the active debate 
surrounding the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (and its 
peacetime passage by more than two dozen states),167 where security needs 
can be anticipated even in broad contours, there is nothing inherent in the 
                                                                                                                          
suspects, which led the British to withdraw from previously planned covert operations with the CIA 
after the United States failed to offer adequate assurances against inhumane treatment and rendition.  
See Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S. Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A6, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“Britain pulled out of some 
planned covert operations with the Central Intelligence Agency, including a major one in 2005, when it 
was unable to obtain assurances that the actions would not result in rendition and inhumane treatment, 
the report said.”).  The full report of the Committee is available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/ 
2007/jul/uk-intel-sec-cttee-rendition-gov-resp.pdf. 
165 See Thomas May, Political Authority in a Bioterror Emergency, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 159, 
159 (2004) (discussing Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, designed to grant state officials 
expansive authority to coordinate biological terror attack response). 
166 Consider, for example, the First Amendment burden of a hypothetical law banning the sale of 
Los Alamos physicists’ notes regarding the physics behind nuclear weapons design-notes published 
long ago in Robert Serber’s The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic 
Bomb. 
167 See, e.g., Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies: 
Bioterrorism, Epidemics and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 379, 382 n.11 (2003) (discussing Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown 
and Johns Hopkins Universities, Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, Dec. 21, 2001). 
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nature of making policy choices involving security-liberty trade-offs that 
necessitate the general alteration of the structures of government power.  
Even where the need for speed may eliminate the feasibility of certain 
kinds of decision-making structures—including those involving multiple 
layers of executive branch operations review—anticipatable categories of 
operations (of which detention is surely one) leaves open the possibility of 
designing ex ante controls and/or ex post checks that address interests of 
legality and efficiency.  Such decisions may indeed involve trade-offs 
between interests.  But given strategic warning, which we no doubt have 
with respect to the threat of nuclear terrorism, it may be possible to decide 
on and implement those trade-offs in advance of an attack and within the 
structure of normal government processes.   
Finally, while the raw effectiveness argument about the strategic costs 
of scant judicial review in this context does not necessarily suggest that 
there is always one right choice between tactical and strategic goals, it does 
suggest that the most we might say about the raw effectiveness impact of 
no-review detention is that it depends on the enemy.  It also suggests that a 
decision-making structure that invariably favors tactics over strategy (or 
security over liberty), or systematically forecloses the consideration of 
either tactical or strategic consequences, will fail to rationally evaluate 
such trade-offs.  As discussed below, an insistence on viewing all 
operations connected with “WMDs” as tantamount to a constitutional 
“emergency” seems liable to ensure against the regular evaluation of 
strategic versus tactical responses to threats. 
This brings us to the new functionalists’ role effectiveness approach.  
For whatever one researcher (especially, the new functionalists would 
suggest, legal researchers) might find in the empirical literature informing 
the nature of security threats and emergency responses, the new 
functionalists’ more forthright argument is that institutional competences 
make the executive better positioned to consider this information and make 
decisions accordingly.  Indeed, in a linear comparison of institutional 
competences, the differences among the branches that flow from 
institutional structure are of course real.  The judiciary, for example, can 
only act in the event of a case or controversy.  The administrative agency 
and national security apparatus may put information, in the first instance, 
in the hands of the executive rather than Congress or the courts.  Moreover, 
the new functionalists add, the judiciary lacks the expertise and the 
procedural and evidentiary resources to make good judgments in an 
emergency; judicial resources are too scarce to require individualized 
determinations as to many hundreds or thousands of detainees it is 
assumed, as a matter of raw effectiveness, it will be necessary to detain.  
And given its own resource constraints and motives, the executive is 
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unlikely to exaggerate the danger posed by an individual, or detain too 
many people.168  Accordingly, the new functionalists tend to favor a 
decision-making structure with loose (if any), emergency-driven 
congressional engagement and deferential (if any) judicial review.   
But such comparative competence accounts are misleading in several 
ways.  They ignore the complexity of current government decision-making 
structures.  The vast executive branch decision-making apparatus means 
decisions rarely come down to the speed possible with one man acting 
alone, and Congress and the courts have at their institutional disposal 
multiple means to enable the sharing of information among the branches.  
Such accounts also critically ignore the possibility of collective 
organizational capacity, a notion Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence seemed squarely to contemplate.169  The executive acting 
alone may be better than the courts acting alone in some circumstances, but 
the executive plus the courts (or Congress) may be more effective than the 
executive alone. 
Perhaps most important, the new functionalist role effectiveness view 
ignores the structural reality that national security policy (indeed all 
government decision-making) is channeled through a set of existing 
organizations, each with its own highly elaborated set of professional 
norms and responsibilities, standard procedures and routines, identities and 
culture, all of which constrain and guide behavior—often in ways that 
centrally affect the organization’s ability to perform its functions.  
Considering how such pathologies affect decision-making, one may find a 
far more sophisticated—and more meaningful—set of comparisons 
between decision-making structures than asking, for example, whether the 
executive can make decisions faster than courts.  The next section explores 
a role effectiveness approach that could take this reality into account. 
B.  An Organizational Effectiveness Approach: Managing High 
Consequence Risk 
Our understanding of organizational decision-making has developed 
substantially since Hamilton, with a diverse range of disciplines engaging 
questions of how organizations act and why.170  In the context of 
                                                                                                                          
168 YOO, supra note 141, at 129–30 (“Imagine the chaos if lawyers descended en masse, 
demanding that evidence against enemy detainees be preserved under a rigorous chain of custody and 
that officers and soldiers be cross-examined about their battlefield decisions.”); see also POSNER & 
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 256 (“There is no reason to think that the executive would benefit from an 
excessive detention or conviction rate, or that political constraints would permit the executive to 
implement such a preference in any event.”). 
169 See supra text accompanying note 124 (suggesting that presidential power should fluctuate in 
response to other branches).  
170 See generally CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1986) (discussing growth 
and evolution of organizational analysis over past twenty-five years). 
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government decision-making, scholars have asked what capabilities and 
constraints an agency has that produce the information from which 
decisions are made, create options from which decisions are chosen, and 
select actions the organization takes.171  In evaluating whether and to what 
extent there should be multiple actors involved in a given decision, the 
organization theorist can evaluate, for example, whether formal constraints 
help or hinder decision-making;172 whether group decision-making is better 
served by competitive or cooperative debate;173 or whether outcomes are 
better or worse with independent or redundant checks.174  Particularly in 
understanding organizations that manage complex and intrinsically 
hazardous duties (like deciding whom to detain and for how long) that pose 
a potentially high risk to public safety—from operating nuclear power 
plants to aircraft carriers to the space shuttle—organization experts have 
tested their theoretical predictions against real-world examples of 
government decision-making performance.175   
While a fully realized empirical study of detention structures is beyond 
the scope of this Article, the raw effectiveness discussion above (arguing 
that the threat of nuclear terrorism is both strategically predictable and 
                                                                                                                          
171 See, e.g., GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 390–92 (2d ed. 1999) (listing model questions that include: “[w]hat capabilities 
and constraints do these organizations’ existing SOPs create in generating the menu of options for 
action?”). 
172 See id. at 147–58 (outlining organizational model of government behavior); see also PATRICK 
J. HANEY, ORGANIZING FOR FOREIGN POLICY CRISES: PRESIDENTS, ADVISERS, AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF DECISION MAKING (1997) (comparing presidential advising structures in managing 
foreign policy crises from Truman to Bush I administrations); cf. ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN 
FORMALITY WORKS: AUTHORITY AND ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 126–33 (2001) 
(discussing how “[o]rganizational flexibility” depends on a “structure of rigidities” in budgeting 
processes and the like). 
173 See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 142–58 (2d ed. 1982) (contrasting Cuban Missile 
Crisis executive decisionmaking process with “groupthink” dynamics in which individual 
decisionmakers conform to group norms, often compromising critical analysis); AMY B. ZEGART, 
SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at 67–69 (2007) (reviewing cultural 
pathologies undermining necessary cooperation in pre-September 11 counterterrorism efforts).  
174 See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT (1985) 
(reviewing theories of bureaucratic competition).  
175 See, e.g., SAGAN, supra note 158 (using organization theory to study decisions regarding 
nuclear weapons safety); DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION 79–91 (1996) 
(discussing organizational failures leading to Space Shuttle explosion); Todd R. LaPorte, High 
Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, Demanding and At Risk, 4 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT., 
60, 60 (1996) (reviewing literature on crisis management and “high reliability organizations,” where 
operating failures can produce catastrophic consequences); Karl E. Weick, Organizational Culture as a 
Source of High Reliability, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1987, at 112–27.  Perhaps foremost in this 
literature is Charles Perrow’s 1984 book, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, 
studying decision-making performance in organizations from nuclear power and petrochemical plants, 
to air and spacecraft operation, to military performance, to the management of natural and biological 
hazards.  CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 304–06 
(1984).  Since then, a range of scholars have sought systematically to identify what common 
characteristics might be visible in organizations that are broadly effective in operating complex systems 
and performing high-risk tasks with a significant degree of success.  See, e.g., Gene I. Rochlin, Reliable 
Organizations, 4 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 55 (1996) (surveying evolution of scholarship).  
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chronically present) suggests that in evaluating what structural 
arrangement is most functionally effective for a detention regime to 
prevent the realization of a nuclear terrorist attack, it may be helpful to 
consider the existing literature analyzing similarly high-risk government 
decision-making.176  First, what organizational structures have performed 
reliably well “in the face of persistent high risks and fluctuating 
conditions”?177  Political scientist Scott Sagan, for example, has explored 
in depth how the military and related security organizations have 
functioned in protecting existing nuclear weapons from accidental or 
unauthorized detonation.178  While there are, of course, some important 
differences between this task and the task of designing a detention regime 
geared toward preventing a terrorist nuclear attack, there are also some 
important similarities.  In both cases, critical operations in an 
organization’s prevention apparatus are carried out by relatively low-level 
officials.179  In both cases, an error by any one lower-level official can lead 
to a strategically significant bad outcome—whether the risk is accidental 
detonation, failure to detain or question an individual setting out to cause 
imminent harm, or, in a different way, the wrongful treatment of an 
innocent suspect that can lead to generations-long strategic obstacles in 
gaining the trust of allies and winning the “hearts” of enemies.  And while 
the terrorism case necessarily involves individuals with malevolent intent 
                                                                                                                          
176 This Article’s focus principally on political science literature is not to suggest other 
organization studies approaches are irrelevant.  On the contrary, cognitive psychology and sociology, 
among others, offer valuable insights into challenges of organizational decision-making.  See generally, 
Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in 
Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045 (2005) (studying affect of emotions 
on political leaders’ decision-making); Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ?  What Counts in 
Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 559 (2006) (discussing how emotional responses 
generate bias in counterterrorism policy); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive 
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002) (discussing 
applicability of cognitive psychological theory of human decision-making to government decision-
making); Cass Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003) 
(analyzing affect of public fear on citizens’ expectations of government).   
177 KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: ASSURING HIGH 
PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 53 (2001).     
178 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 8–9.   
179 In the nuclear safety context: “Most of the critical decisions influencing the risk of accidental 
war were made by lower-ranking officials, without the involvement or full awareness of political 
authorities in Washington.”  SAGAN, supra note 158, at 256.  The same has been more than evident as 
the United States has carried out the tasks of detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects—tasks 
performed in the first instance by troops including a range of individuals, from highly trained law 
enforcement officers to often far less skilled young troops in the field.  See, e.g., INSPECTOR GEN., 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 36 (2004) [hereinafter DAIG REPORT], 
available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDetaineeAbuse/DAIG%20Detainee%20 
Operations%20Inspection%20Report.pdf; Major General George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the 
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, in INVESTIGATION OF 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 34, 49–52 (2004) [hereinafter Fay Report], available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf; FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL 
TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 55 (2004) [hereinafter DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 
REPORT], available at  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf. 
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(whereas a nuclear weapons or other major disaster might occur without 
anyone meaning to do harm), the tactical uncertainties about when, where, 
and how a terrorist may exercise that intent leaves an organization seeking 
to manage the risk each threat poses in a similar position.  The causes of a 
bad outcome may be multifarious and unknown, but the worst-case 
foreseeable consequences of a bad outcome may be identified in advance 
with some specificity.180 
A second potentially relevant set of examples surrounds crisis 
decision-making per se, based on the possibility that we may acquire pre-
attack tactical information or need to maintain functional detention 
operations in the immediate aftermath of a successful nuclear attack.  Real-
world examples like the 1995 sarin gas attack by terrorists in the Tokyo 
subway system,181 responses to September 11th itself, and increasingly 
elaborate government simulations of multi-city terrorist incidents involving 
nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons—all have helped to test 
theorists’ expectations against the actual performance of the organizations 
likely to be involved in any detention scheme (the military, law 
enforcement, civilian agencies and national security policy structures in the 
executive branch – and the incentives that drive them).182  From these 
examples, one might begin to test new functionalist preferences for 
characteristics like flexibility, unity, secrecy, and dispatch.  And one might 
hope to extract a set of characteristics that detention decision-making 
organizations in this context would ideally possess.   
1.  Flexibility and Formality 
The new functionalists’ instinctive attraction to flexibility in decision-
making rules or structures—and its corresponding possibilities of secrecy 
                                                                                                                          
180 While different response activities are of course contemplated depending on the nature of the 
incident, there are important, recognized functional similarities between accidental and deliberate 
incidents in structuring a coherent organizational response.  Indeed, the U.S. National Response 
Framework—the federal planning document setting forth how the government is expected to function 
in significant emergency response situations—groups in a single annex the discussion of responses to 
the accidental or terrorist-driven release of radioactive material that poses a threat to national security, 
public health and safety.  See NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX (2008), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/thd/IncidentNucRad.pdf.  
181 Robyn L. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway 
System, in COUNTERING TERRORISM: DIMENSIONS OF PREPAREDNESS 371–410 (Arnold M. Howitt & 
Robyn L. Pangi eds., 2003). 
182 See, e.g., OFF. OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TOPOFF (TOP OFFICIALS) 
(2002), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12129.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (explaining 
TOPOFF, “a national-level domestic and international exercise series designed to produce a more 
effective, coordinated, global response to WMD terrorism”); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE TOPOFF 
3 FULL-SCALE EXERCISE, http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/training/editorial_0594.shtm (last visited Aug. 
28, 2008) (explaining TOPOFF 3 which “offered agencies and jurisdictions a way to exercise a 
coordinated national and international response to a large-scale, multipoint terrorist attack”); Thomas 
V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 436 (2001) (noting “a number of medical and public health observations and lessons 
discovered during the bioterrorism component of the [TOPOFF] exercise”).   
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and dispatch—is not without foundation in organization theory.183  
Flexibility ideally can make it possible for organizations to adapt and 
respond quickly in circumstances of substantial strain or uncertainty, as 
conditions change or knowledge improves, and to respond to events that 
cannot be predicted in advance.184  In a crisis or emergency setting in 
particular, one can of course imagine circumstances in which taking the 
time to follow a series of structurally required decision-making steps 
would vitiate the need for action altogether.185   
What the new functionalists fail to engage, however, are flexibility’s 
substantial costs, especially in grappling with an emergency.  For example, 
organizations that depend on decentralized decision-making but leave 
subordinates too much flexibility can face substantial principal-agent 
problems, resulting in effectively arbitrary decisions.  The problem of 
differences in motivation or understanding between organizational leaders 
and frontline agents is a familiar one, a disjunction that can leave agents 
poorly equipped to translate organizational priorities into priority-
consistent operational goals.  As Sagan found in the context of U.S. 
nuclear weapons safety, whatever level of importance organizational 
leadership placed on safety, leaders and operatives would invariably have 
conflicting priorities, making it likely that leaders would pay “only 
arbitrary attention to the critical details of deciding among trade-offs” 
faced by operatives in real time.186  One way of describing this 
phenomenon is as “goal displacement”—a narrow interpretation of 
operational goals by agents that obscures focus on overarching priorities.187  
In the military context, units in the field may have different interests than 
commanders in secure headquarters;188 prison guards have different 
                                                                                                                          
183 See supra text accompanying notes 41–46 (citing John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age 
of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 812–22 (2004); John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1183, 1200 (2004); John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1639, 1642–43, 1676–77 (2002)). 
184 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 120; see also STINCHCOMBE, supra note 172 (developing theory of 
formalization, its anticipated effects and its pathologies); WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 177, at 68–
69 (examining strategies for management); ZEGART, supra note 173, at 15–42 (discussing U.S. 
intelligence agencies’ failure to adapt to post-Cold War terrorist threat).   
185 This is of course precisely the basis of exigent circumstances exceptions of many 
constitutional mandates, such as the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  See, e.g., Michigan v. 
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) (fight a fire and investigate its cause); United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (“hot pursuit” of fleeing suspect); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) 
(prevent imminent destruction of evidence); see also sources cited infra note 247. 
186 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 255. 
187 SCOTT D. SAGAN AND KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE 
RENEWED 51 (2003). 
188 See Donna Winslow, Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of 
Discipline in Two Peace Operations, J. MIL. & STRATEGIC STUD., Jan. 1999, at 3 (“Exaggerated loyalty 
to the group can lead members to work at counter purposes to the overall goals of a mission or even of 
the army . . . .”); Leonard Wong, Combat Motivation in Today’s Soldiers, 32 ARMED FORCES & 
SOCIETY 659, 662 (2006) (discussing soldier motivation in combat). 
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interests from prison administrators.189  Emergencies exacerbate the risk of 
such effectively arbitrary decisions.  Critical information may be 
unavailable or inaccessible.190  Short-term interests may seek to exploit 
opportunities that run counter to desired long-term (or even near-term) 
outcomes. 191  The distance between what a leader wants and what an agent 
knows and does is thus likely even greater. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis affords striking examples of such a problem.  
When informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the growing tensions with 
the Soviet Union in late October 1962, NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe, American General Lauris Norstad, ordered 
subordinate commanders in Europe not to take any actions that the Soviets 
might consider provocative.192  Putting forces on heightened alert status 
was just the kind of potentially provocative move Norstad sought to 
forestall.  Indeed, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered U.S. forces 
globally to increase alert status in a directive leaving room for Norstad to 
exercise his discretion in complying with the order, Norstad initially 
decided not to put European-stationed forces on alert.193 Yet despite 
Norstad’s no-provocation instruction, his subordinate General Truman 
Landon, then Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, increased the alert 
level of nuclear-armed NATO aircraft in the region.194  In Sagan’s account, 
General Landon’s first organizational priority—to maximize combat 
potential—led him to undermine higher priority political interests in 
avoiding potential provocations of the Soviets.195   
It is in part for such reasons that studies of organizational performance 
in crisis management have regularly found that “planning and effective 
                                                                                                                          
189 See, e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987) (examining prison culture and management).  
190 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE 
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO 
HURRICANE KATRINA 163 (2006), http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm (last visited Aug. 
28, 2008) [hereinafter KATRINA REPORT] (describing how massive communications failures hindered 
governmental response after Hurricane Katrina); see also Rinaldo Campana, Responding to an Incident 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction—An Overview, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 249, 254 (2003) (“In 
this nuclear exercise scenario, the On-Scene-Commander received three dissimilar plume assessments 
from EPA, DOE and the U.S. Army.  The disparity in the plume assessment delayed the decision-
making process, which in an actual incident could mean the loss of many lives.  Sometimes too much 
information becomes an impediment to rapid response decision.”); Michael May et al., Preparing for 
the Worst, 443 NATURE 907, 908 (2006) (describing difficulty of tracing origin of stolen weapons grade 
material used in nuclear device—information critical to mounting effective preventive and responsive 
measures—and concluding that under ideal circumstances, nuclear forensics process is likely to take 
one to two weeks). 
191 See PERROW, supra note 78, at 44 (“Short-term interests seize on disasters as opportunities to 
be exploited.”).   
192 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 102.   
193 Id. at 103.  
194 Id. at 104–05.   
195 Id. at 256; see also SAGAN, supra note 158, at 102–14 (detailing management of alert activities 
in Europe surrounding Cuban Missile Crisis). 
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response are causally connected.”196  Clear, well-understood rules, 
formalized training and planning can function to match cultural and 
individual instincts that emerge in a crisis with commitments that flow 
from standard operating procedures and professional norms.197  Indeed, 
“the less an organization has to change its pre-disaster functions and roles 
to perform in a disaster, the more effective is its disastetr [sic] response.”198  
In this sense, a decisionmaker with absolute flexibility in an emergency—
unconstrained by protocols or plans—may be systematically more prone to 
error than a decision-maker who is in some way compelled to follow 
procedures and guidelines, which have incorporated professional expertise, 
and which are set as effective constraints in advance.   
Examples of excessive flexibility producing adverse consequences are 
ample.  Following Hurricane Katrina, one of the most important lessons 
independent analysis drew from the government response was the extent to 
which the disaster was made worse as a result of the lack of experience and 
knowledge of crisis procedures among key officials, the absence of expert 
advisors available to key officials (including the President), and the failure 
to follow existing response plans or to draw from lessons learned from 
simulations conducted before the fact. 199  Among the many consequences, 
                                                                                                                          
196 CLARKE, supra note 149, at 56; see, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: ENHANCED LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATION’S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 
RECOVERY SYSTEM, GAO-06-618, at 99–100 (2006) [hereinafter CATASTROPHIC DISASTER REPORT] 
(reporting to Congressional Committees and making recommendations in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina for executive action in regards to nation’s preparedness, response and recovery system); Dennis 
S. Mileti & John H. Sorensen, Determinants of Organizational Effectiveness in Responding to Low 
Probability Catastrophic Events, 22 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 13, 13–19 (1987) (synthesizing findings 
of studies of effectiveness of organizations in coping with disasters and developing a theory of 
organizational effectiveness in responding to low probability catastrophic events); see also U.S. ARMED 
FORCES, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-40: JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, at IV-9 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_40.pdf (“The overall 
success of the response to a WMD attack is directly proportional to the prior planning.  If the response 
is properly planned, rehearsed, and executed, the actions will serve as a deterrent to future attacks.”).   
197 See, e.g., SAGAN, supra, note 158, at 46 (noting positive effects of “[r]igorous exercises, 
continual training, and realistic simulations”); BENDOR, supra note 174, at 24–60 (examining theory of 
bureaucratic competition and redundancy); see also KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190, at 131–46 
(concluding “senior [Department of Homeland Security] officials were “ill prepared due to their lack of 
experience and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by [National Response 
Plan]”); Caron Chess & Lee Clarke, Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax Attacks of 
2001: The Organizational Backstory, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1578, 1578 (2007) (concluding that pre-
existing organizational and professional networks facilitated trust among decisionmakers, which 
improved communication among agencies and risk communication with public); Pangi, supra note 181, 
at 408–09 (emphasizing development of interagency and intergovernmental disaster management 
relationships, training and routines “before a disaster occurs,” as “essential to planning for and 
responding to a WMD attack”).  Accord PERROW, supra note 78, at 51–52 (describing deleterious 
effects of political cronyism at FEMA).     
198 Mileti & Sorensen, supra note 196, at 14.  
199 KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190, at 131–46.  
Within the emergency management community, there are a handful of potential 
catastrophes that keep disaster professionals awake at night.  Perhaps the most 
troubling of these has been a category 3 or larger storm striking New Orleans 
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basic items like food, water, and medicines were in such short supply that 
local law enforcement (instead of focusing on security issues) were 
occupied, in part, with breaking into businesses and taking what residents 
needed.200  
Or consider the widespread abuse of prisoners at U.S. detention 
facilities such as Abu Ghraib.  Whatever the theoretical merits of applying 
coercive interrogation in a carefully selected way against key intelligence 
targets,201 the systemic torture and abuse of scores of detainees was an 
outcome no one purported to seek.  There is substantial agreement among 
security analysts of both parties that the prisoner abuse scandals have 
produced predominantly negative consequences for U.S. national 
security.202  While there remain important questions about the extent to 
which some of the abuses at Abu Ghraib were the result of civilian or 
senior military command actions or omissions, one of the too often 
overlooked findings of the government investigations of the incidents is the 
unanimous agreement that the abuse was (at least in part) the result of 
structural organization failures203—failures that one might expect to 
                                                                                                                          
because of its high likelihood of occurrence, the extreme vulnerability of the city to 
long term flooding, and the difficulty of evacuating a large urban population over 
limited evacuation routes.  As a result, this scenario has been studied, planned, and 
exercised perhaps more than any other potential catastrophic disaster in the country.  
A senior disaster professional would be well aware of the consequences of such a 
storm, recognize the challenges of responding to such a disaster, and appreciate the 
need for timely and proactive federal assistance.  Comments such as those the 
President made about not expecting the levees to breach do not appear to be 
consistent with the advice and counsel one would expect to have been provided by a 
senior disaster professional. 
Id. at 133.   
200 Id. at 241.   
201 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 184–86.  
202 See, e.g., Guantanamo’s Shadow, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2007, at 40 (polling a bipartisan group of 
leading foreign policy experts and finding eighty-seven percent believed U.S. detention system had hurt 
more than helped in fight against Al Qaeda).   
Nothing has hurt America’s image and standing in the world—and nothing has 
undermined the global effort to combat nihilistic terrorism—[more] than the brutal 
torture and dehumanizing actions of Americans in Abu Ghraib and in other prisons 
(secret or otherwise).  America can win the fight against terrorism only if it acts in 
ways consistent with the values for which it stands.   
Id. (quoting an anonymous poll respondent).  A separate concern stems from the severe strain these 
practices have put on relationships with key counterterrorism allies.  See INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 
COMMITTEE, RENDITION, REPORT, 2007, Cm. 7171, at 64–69, available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7171/7171.pdf (discussing “serious implications for the working of 
the relationship between the U.S. and UK intelligence and security agencies” of U.S. decisions 
regarding prisoner treatment).  Still other concerns are more immediately instrumental.  As one U.S. 
Army intelligence officer who served in Afghanistan put it in his subsequent book: “The more a 
prisoner hates America, the harder he will be to break.  The more a population hates America, the less 
likely its citizens will be to lead us to a suspect.”  CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE 
INTERROGATORS: TASK FORCE 500 AND AMERICA’S SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA, at xxix (2004).    
203 See, e.g., Fay Report, supra note 179, at 109–19 (finding lack of clear command and control of 
detainee operations, inadequate training, non-observance of established procedures, lapses in 
accountability, and similar failures surrounding intelligence operations at Abu Ghraib); DEP’T OF DEF., 
REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERROGATION OPERATIONS 3 (2006), available at 
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produce errors either to the benefit or detriment of security.  
In particular, military investigators looking at the causes of Abu 
Ghraib cited vague guidance, as well as inadequate training and planning 
for detention and interrogation operations, as key factors leading to the 
abuse.  Remarkably, “pre-war planning [did] not include[] planning for 
detainee operations” in Iraq.204  Moreover, investigators cited failures at the 
policy level—decisions to lift existing detention and interrogation 
strictures without replacing those rules with more than the most general 
guidance about custodial intelligence collection.205  As one Army General 
later investigating the abuses noted: “By October 2003, interrogation 
policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it 
became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at 
what level non-doctrinal approaches had to be approved.”206  It was thus 
unsurprising that detention and interrogation operations were assigned to 
troops with grossly inadequate training in any rules that were still 
recognized.207  The uncertain effect of broad, general guidance, coupled 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2282 (follow “executive summary 
of the results” hyperlink) [hereinafter DOD REVIEW] (finding, inter alia, “no evidence that specific 
detention or interrogation lessons learned from previous conflicts . . . were incorporated into planning 
for operations in support of the Global War on Terror, and no “evidence [of] any specific awareness of 
the risk of detainee abuse - or any awareness that U.S. forces had confronted this problem before); 
Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and the 205th 
Military Intelligence Brigade, in INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB  4–15 
(2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter Jones 
Report] (discussing how structural decisions, inter alia, “created conditions which allowed the abuses at 
Abu Ghraib to occur”); DAIG REPORT, supra note 179; MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY D. MILLER, 
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 2 
(2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Taguba%20Annex%2020.pdf 
(observing “that the Task Force did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified 
strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq”); ARTICLE 15-6 
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 36-44 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA 
REPORT], available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (describing inadequate 
training and oversight, inappropriate superior-subordinate relationships); DOD DETENTION 
OPERATIONS REPORT,  supra note 179 (reviewing causes of detainee abuse in Department of Defense 
detention operations).   
204 Fay Report, supra note 179, at 57.  Among the consequences of inadequate planning, the ratio 
of detainees to military police at facilities like Abu Ghraib in June 2004 (during height of abuse) rose to 
75:1 (about 7,000 prisoners to about 92 military police).  DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS REPORT, 
supra note 179, at 54, 60. 
205 See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, 
Detention and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1257–67 (2006) (reviewing Pentagon investigations into 
causes of abuses at U.S. detention facilities).  
206 Fay Report, supra note 179, at 61.  It was during this period, as later became clear, that some 
of the worst torture and abuse occurred.   
207 The 372nd Military Police Company—the unit in charge of military police operations at Abu 
Ghraib during the period when the worst abuses were taking place—was a combat support unit, with no 
training in detainee operations.  Summary of Interview by Taguba Panel with Sgt. First Class, 372nd 
Military Police Company, in Abu Ghraib, Iraq (Feb. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/a85.pdf.  A post–Abu Ghraib survey conducted by the Army 
Inspector General found non-commissioned officers reporting that they had received little detention 
operations training, and that training exercises had not involved instruction in how to process or assign 
a legal status to detainees.  DAIG REPORT, supra note 179, at 81; see also DOD REVIEW, supra note 
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with the competing imperatives of guidelines that differed among theaters 
of operation, agencies, and military units, caused serious confusion among 
troops and led to decisionmaking that it is overly kind to call arbitrary.208   
Would the new functionalists disagree with the importance of 
government planning for detention operations in an emergency 
surrounding a terrorist nuclear attack?  Not necessarily.  Can an 
organization anticipate and plan for everything?  Certainly not.  But such 
findings should at least call into question the inclination to simply  
maximize flexibility and discretion in an emergency, without, for example, 
structural incentives that might ensure the engagement of professional 
expertise.209  Particularly if one embraces the view that the most potentially 
damaging terrorist threats are nuclear and biological terrorism, involving 
highly technical information about weapons acquisition and deployment, a 
security policy structure based on nothing more than general popular 
mandate and political instincts is unlikely to suffice; a structure that 
systematically excludes knowledge of and training in emergency response 
will almost certainly result in mismanagement.210  In this light, a general 
take on role effectiveness might suggest favoring a structure in which the 
engagement of relevant expertise in crisis management is required, leaders 
have incentives to anticipate and plan in advance for trade-offs, and 
                                                                                                                          
203, at 19 (noting that few U.S. personnel “had received specific training relevant to detainee screening 
and medical treatment”).  Reservists in particular (many of whom did not know they would be 
engaging in detention operations until after they were deployed) cited the confusing difference between 
what training they had received on the Geneva Conventions, and the guidance they were receiving in 
the field.  DAIG REPORT, supra note 179, at 81, 83–84.  At more senior levels, eighty-seven percent of 
the units stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq inspected by the Army Inspector General post–Abu Ghraib 
responded that the basic professional military education they had received lacked instruction on 
conducting detainee operations.  Id.  The problem was particularly acute with inspected reservist units, 
many members of which reported that they were not notified that they would be involved in detainee 
operations until after their deployment overseas.  Id. at 83. 
208 See Fay Report, supra note 179, at 112–13, 118–19 (finding, inter alia, that “DoD’s 
development of multiple policies on interrogation operations for use in different theaters or operations 
confused Army and civilian Interrogators at Abu Ghraib”); Jones Report, supra note 203, at 5 
(“Confusion about what interrogation techniques were authorized resulted from the proliferation of 
guidance and information from other theaters of operation; individual interrogator experiences in other 
theaters; and, the failure to distinguish between interrogation operations in other theaters and Iraq. This 
confusion contributed to the occurrence of some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses.”); DOD 
DETENTION OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 179, at 14, 33–38, 80–81 (finding “details of the current 
[detainee] policy vague and lacking”); Frontline: The Torture Question (PBS television broadcast Oct. 
18, 2005) (quoting Gen. Paul Kern) (“There was [also] some degree of confusion about how dogs could 
be used.  Dogs are a good thing to control detainees, they’re not a good thing to do interrogations.  And 
so people were using very liberal interpretations of what was on a piece of paper, inaccurately and 
illegally.”), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/etc/script.html. 
209 Contra ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 109 (“Serious deliberation is simply incompatible with 
the speedy response required in the aftermath of an attack.”); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 
256 (arguing against due process-based constraints on executive detention decisions on the grounds that 
there is no basis for doubting that the executive is best positioned to strike any relevant liberty-security 
balance on its own). 
210 See KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190 at 2 (“It does not appear the President received 
adequate advice and counsel from a senior disaster professional.”).  
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organizations are able to train subordinates to ensure that plans are adhered 
to in emergencies.  Such structural constraints could help increase the 
likelihood that something more than arbitrary attention has been paid 
before transcendent priorities are overridden. 
2.  Unity and Insularity 
As the new functionalists correctly anticipate, organization theorists 
have also recognized that strict bureaucratic control, intense socialization, 
and a highly developed sense of organizational culture can not only make 
rapid action possible, but also ensure adherence to an identified, 
overarching priority. 211  Indeed, it follows from the prior section that if 
formal rules and training are important, some significant level of control is 
absolutely necessary lest one risk effective top-down compliance.   
At the same time, however, institutions such as the military (and 
arguably aspects of the intelligence community) that are defined by such 
insular organizational cultures have some important disadvantages.212  The 
exceptional degree of control such organizations exercise over their 
members has been used both to advance an organization’s official goals, 
and to pursue the more self-serving or alternative goals of its leaders.  
Members’ intense organizational loyalty can foster excessive secrecy and 
disdain for outside expertise, inhibiting the flow of information both within 
and from outside the institution, and skewing attention to organizational 
priorities.213  Especially when coupled with political incentives that impact 
governmental organizations, such features can limit the institution’s ability 
to take corrective action or learn from past organizational mistakes.214   
The post–9/11 context is rife with examples of such pathologies in 
organizations responsible for counterterrorism operations.  Consider the 
U.S. response to the anthrax mailings of late 2001, which came at a time of 
already heightened vigilance against terrorist attack.  After federal 
                                                                                                                          
211 See, e.g., John J. Dilulio Jr., Recovering the Public Management Variable: Lessons from 
Schools, Prisons, and Armies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 127, 129–31 (1989) (surveying research on 
organizational characteristics of effective prison management and combat units).  
212 The military is particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon, as it is often considered a “total 
institution” in the sense sociologists (among others) use the expression to capture organizations in 
effectively complete control of the planning, management, and fulfillment of the needs of individuals 
within it—control geared toward advancing the interests and goals of the institution.  See ERVING 
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 
4–6 (1961).  
213 See, e.g., SAGAN, supra note 158, at 252–54 (discussing how desire to protect institutional 
image may create incentive to cover up mistakes). 
214Id. at 257; ZEGART, supra note 173, at 112–13.  Outside the military context, Diane Vaughan, 
author of a much celebrated work on the organizational failings that led to the 1985 space shuttle 
Challenger disaster, has described such organizational cultures as fostering the “normalization of 
deviance”—a phenomenon that enables organizational agents to “carry on as if nothing was wrong” 
despite being continually confronted with evidence that “something was wrong.” VAUGHAN, supra 
note 175, at 62 (attributing phenomenon to “the production of a work group culture, the culture of 
production, and structural secrecy”). 
 2009] THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 1609 
investigators concluded that the anthrax attacks were most likely launched 
by “U.S. nationals, almost certainly ones with experience in and access to 
the U.S. biodefense program and its facilities,” and after they discovered 
that major U.S. biodefense facilities had been working with anthrax 
(including weapons-grade powder) for decades, military and intelligence 
agencies continued to withhold critical information from other federal 
agencies about the facilities and employees involved in such programs.  
This hamstrung post-attack efforts to identify the likely source of the 
attack, and therefore the likelihood of subsequent additional attacks from 
the same source.215   
Such behavior echoes that described by the 9/11 Commission 
investigators studying the September 11th attacks themselves.216  Among 
other things, investigators concluded that one of the key problems leading 
to the failure to avert the attacks (despite increasingly alarming warnings) 
was the dearth of information sharing inside the intelligence and security 
communities.217  Information was overly compartmentalized, “stove-piped” 
to too few decisionmakers, hidden by one executive agency from another 
and by one branch of government from another, and limited in its 
relevance and accuracy from an absence of oversight and competing 
analysis.218  Such findings also emerge from studies of the generally 
effective Japanese response to the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway 
system.  Essential to the Japanese government’s response was “a 
willingness to prioritize cooperation over interagency or intergovernment 
competition.”219  In all of these cases, it may well be that such behavior 
could be addressed by different incentive structures.  But in the absence of 
such guidance, it was the organizations instinctive (and structural) 
insularity that prevailed. 
The counterproductive effect of such pathologies can infect more than 
just real-time responsiveness; it inhibits error correction over time—a 
                                                                                                                          
215 Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism in the First Years of the Twenty-
First Century, POL. & LIFE SCI., September 2002, at 3, 20. 
216 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 353. 
217 Id. at 353–58.  
218 Id. at 353–58, 403.  
219 Pangi, supra note 181, at 371, 408–09.  The sarin attacks were the work of Japanese doomsday 
cult Aum Shinrikyo, which placed small containers of the chemical nerve agent sarin on trains running 
on three major lines of the Tokyo subway system at the height of rush hour on March 20, 1995.  
Thanks to several technical mistakes in disseminating the gas, the effects were not as bad as they might 
have been.  Nonetheless, twelve people died and fifty-five hundred were injured as commuters and 
subway workers suffered severe fits of coughing, choking and vomiting.  Senate Government Affairs 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Statement Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo (October 31, 1995), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_rpt/aum/index.html.  See 1996 Police White Paper 29 (National 
Police Agency ed., Emiko Amaki & Robert Mauksch trans., 2002), (1996) available at 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/eanp/wpap.pdf (praising modifications to police law that gave prefectural 
police authority to work on their own outside of their jurisdictions to deal with “extensive organized 
crime”). 
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feature that theorists identify as central in explaining the success of those 
organizations that have operated effectively in chronically unpredictable 
environments.220  In the nuclear safety context, for example, Scott Sagan 
showed that Americans had been at greater risk than once thought from 
accidents involving the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal—threats ranging 
from pilot error, malfunctioning computer warnings, the miscalculation of 
an individual officer, and a host of other seemingly inconceivable 
mistakes221—in part because actors at every organizational level had 
incentives to cover up safety problems, “in order to protect the reputation 
of the institution.”222  While it was perhaps “not surprising that the military 
commands that are responsible for controlling nuclear forces would create 
a veil of safety to manage their image in front of the [P]resident, the 
Congress, and the public,” Sagan found that concern for the effect of 
revealing mistakes skewed assessments at all levels, “influenc[ing] the 
reporting of near-accidents by operators, the beliefs of organizational 
historians about what is acceptable to record, and the public interpretation 
of events by senior authorities.”223  Particularly in operations where failure, 
when it does occur, can come at an extraordinarily high price, there is a 
premium on gaining (and implementing) as much insight as possible from 
those failures that do occur.224 
One finds a strikingly similar pattern in the conduct of organizations 
responsible for the detentions at Abu Ghraib, where organizational loyalty 
and a cultural disinclination to share negative information conspired to 
prevent the correction of systemic error.225  In some cases, soldiers 
reported direct pressure to withhold unfavorable information.226  More 
generally, investigators found agreement among commanders and enlisted 
personnel at Abu Ghraib that the early reports by outside monitors of 
                                                                                                                          
220 See, e.g., WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 177, at 54–59.  
221 The prospect of such accidents was only recently confirmed with the inadvertent air transport 
of a set of armed nuclear warheads across the continental United States.  See Joby Warrick & Walter 
Pincus, Missteps in the Bunker, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
WPOST File (“A former Air Force senior master sergeant wrote separately that ‘mistakes were made at 
the lowest level of supervision and this snowballed into the [sic] one of the biggest mistakes in USAF 
history.  I am still scratching my head wondering how this could [have] happened.’”).   
222 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 254.  
223 Id. at 257; see also ELIOT A. COHEN & JOHN GOOCH, MILITARY MISFORTUNES: THE 
ANATOMY OF FAILURE IN WAR 44 (1990) (“[B]ureaucratic self-protection by means of the creation of 
spurious or misleading documents can be overwhelming.”).   
224 See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 177, at 56. 
225 National Security Whistleblowers in the Post–September 11th Era: Lost in a Labyrinth and 
Facing Subtle Retaliation: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations of the Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 108–13 (2006) 
(prepared statement of Sgt. Samuel J. Provance).  
226 Id. at 108 (“When I made clear to my superiors that I was troubled about what had happened, I 
was told that the honor of my unit and the Army depended on either withholding the truth or outright 
lies.”); see also Rick Scavetta, GI Flagged for Public Comments About His Abu Ghraib Experience, 
STARS & STRIPES, May 28, 2004, http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article= 
21598&archive=true. 
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serious abuses by soldiers at the facility were simply impossible to 
believe.227  As General Fay’s later investigation found: 
Within this investigation’s timeframe, . . . the 
[independent International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC)] visited Abu Ghraib three times, notifying [the joint 
task force in charge] twice of their visit results, describing 
serious violations of international Humanitarian Law and of 
the Geneva Conventions.  In spite of the ICRC’s role as 
independent observers, there seemed to be a consensus 
among personnel at Abu Ghraib that the allegations were not 
true.  Neither the leadership, nor [the joint task force in 
charge] made any attempt to verify the allegations.228   
What if anything do such examples teach us about whether inter-
branch engagement is necessary to control such organizational tendencies?  
After all, there is a host of organizations within the executive branch, many 
with cultures significantly different from one another.  If organizational 
insularity is the problem, why is the solution not simply to redesign 
internal incentive structures, as noted above, or open the insular 
organization to review or monitoring by a culturally diverse agency within 
the executive branch?  Part IV below considers whether and to what extent 
such a system might suffice in the detention context.  For present purposes, 
however, we might at least conclude that the detention system we want 
would include some institutional mechanism designed to correct such 
known organizational pathologies, a mechanism that (in keeping with the 
conclusions of the previous section) would need to be modified only 
modestly to function well in emergencies. 
3.  Redundancy and Review 
The organization literature is rich in debates over the benefits and 
burdens of redundant systems.  In the commercial manufacturing and 
safety contexts, it is easy to see how a simple argument plays out: a plane 
with an extra engine weighs more, thus requiring more fuel (and more 
money) to fly.  But an airline may save significant costs (not to mention 
glean other benefits over the long term) if the extra engine is occasionally 
available as a backup if the main engine malfunctions in flight.229 
Redundant equipment could, the argument goes, render the whole 
                                                                                                                          
227 Fay Report, supra note 179, at 99–100. 
228 Id. at 152; see also ART. 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 38 
(2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (“[B]ecause of past 
associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took 
precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.”).  
229 Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing 
Agencies in the Post–9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1683 (2006). 
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apparatus effectively more reliable than its components.230  In the context 
of national security decision-making, theorists have offered parallel 
assessments of the costs and benefits of redundancy.231  Redundant 
decision-making systems not only increase serious costs of all sorts—
money, time, the risk (depending on the particular redundant design) that 
certain kinds of errors will occur—they may create counterproductive 
competition between groups, prompting a “race to the bottom” in 
production, preventing cooperation essential to organizational 
effectiveness, and compromising values, like accountability, by making it 
harder for outsiders to determine which one individual or organizational 
group is responsible when things go wrong.232  
The new functionalists’ concerns about judicial review broadly import 
the cost side of redundancy.  Redundant decision-making structures are not 
only prohibitively resource intensive (especially, it is assumed, in a heavy-
volume business like detention), they slow down decision-making to the 
point of ineffectiveness.  And these costs inhere, it is said, even though 
courts have no expertise in such matters of their own, and their inclusion 
increases the risk that information important to keep secret might be 
revealed.233   
But in addition to glossing over the potential benefits of multiple 
system checks (which is revisited below), such arguments mistakenly 
imagine that a redundant system is effectively the same as a system of 
review.  In a redundant system, functions are simply duplicated.  A system 
including review works in series, with each structure performing different 
functions to improve decision-making quality overall.  Where redundant 
structures create duplication that might produce, for example, 
counterproductive competition between groups, review structures can serve 
not simply to replicate first-order decision-making, but to apply a different 
process altogether, including different sets of methodological tools and 
decision-making criteria.  Thus, in addition to preserving the possibility of 
‘mere’ error correction, monitoring or review can “prevent organizational 
blind spots from developing, . . . and reduce the temptation for 
organizations to be guided by narrow conceptions of self-interest.”234  It 
                                                                                                                          
230 See BENDOR, supra note 174, at 24–28. 
231 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 229, at 1675–76. 
232 See id. at 1765–84 (summarizing arguments from redundancy literature).  Indeed, in analyses 
of the intelligence failures surrounding 9/11, structural duplication (and fragmentation) that could 
ideally have helped avoid error in fact burdened intelligence collection and analysis pre–9/11: “[T]rails 
would go cold, information would not be shared, and dots would not get connected because everyone 
assumed that the responsibility for specific tasks rested, at least in part, someplace else.”  ZEGART, 
supra note 173, at 113. 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 39–42 (recounting new functionalist arguments). 
234 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 269; see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact 
of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the 
Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 12, 25–28 (DiIulio, ed. 1990) 
(describing role of court intervention and new regulatory framework in driving corrections 
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can police incentive structures that promote accuracy-enhancing attention 
to process and professionalism.  It is for such reasons that theorists like 
Sagan suggest that independent monitoring could help combat the 
disadvantages that flow from the “unitary” institutional cultures discussed 
above.235   
The relevance of this distinction becomes apparent when held up 
against the new functionalist arguments.  For example, if a key function of 
review is to police a professionalism-enhancing incentive structure, it is 
possible to obtain the benefits of review without the potentially substantial 
time burden of insisting upon real-time continuous monitoring of 
operations, whether or not the situation at hand is an “emergency.”  
Likewise, where the reviewer is not meant to replicate first-order decision-
making but rather to apply a different metric and/or methodology to the 
same problem, it may be necessary for the reviewing agent to have access 
to the same decision-making information as the first-order actor, but not 
necessarily the same type of decision-making expertise.236 
Critical to the distinction between redundancy and review—and thus 
central to the ability of any review mechanism to function usefully—are 
several features that must be emphasized here.  First, a review mechanism 
must avoid the aptly named “problem of redundancy problem.” This is one 
of the problems described as plaguing the intelligence community leading 
up to the 9/11 attacks—“awareness of other redundant units can decrease 
system reliability if it leads an individual or subunit to shirk off unpleasant 
duties because it is assumed that someone else will take care of the 
problem.”237  All actors in a redundant system may make decisions less 
carefully because of their awareness of other actors working on the same 
problem.  The first actor assumes the second actor will catch any mistakes 
he overlooks, and the second actor defers to the first actor on the 
assumption that someone else has already thought about the problem 
carefully. 
                                                                                                                          
professionalization, auditing, and other practices geared toward improved organizational performance); 
KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190, at 131–46; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive 
Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 258–66 (2006) (discussing advantages of agency audits). 
235 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 269; see also Todd R. La Porte, Challenges of Assuring High 
Reliability When Facing Suicidal Terrorism, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW 
PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 99, 108–10 (Philip E. Auerswald et al. eds., 
2006) (noting that “external watchers” can increase attentiveness and reliability). 
236 See Cuéllar, supra note 234, at 262 (“External review may elucidate things that people inside 
the organization fail to appreciate. Outsiders may see things not despite, but precisely because of, the 
absence of expertise.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial 
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 754–56 (2006) (discussing rationale for hard look review). 
237 Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces 
May Produce Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 935, 939 (emphasis added).  In psychology, 
the phenomenon has been called a state of “pluralistic ignorance.”  See, e.g., John M. Darley et al., Do 
Groups Always Inhibit Individuals’ Responses to Potential Emergencies, 26 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 395, 395–99 (“An individual who witnesses a potential emergency alone is more likely to 
intervene than one who witnesses it as a member of a group.”). 
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An independent review system can, at least in theory, avoid this 
problem.  To return to the airplane engine metaphor, the reviewer does not 
take the same tools, instruction manual, and personnel and try to build a 
duplicate engine; it looks at the engine and applies a different set of tools, 
instructions, and personnel to evaluate its performance.  Provided the 
reviewer has access to the entire engine, and can force corrective action if, 
for example, manufacturing flaws are evident, there should be little reason 
to fear that the initial manufacturer will pass on engines missing key 
component parts and expect the reviewer to install them. That said, a 
review system that is given only a two-dimensional picture of the engine 
and not the engine itself, and that fills in for any missing information by 
assuming it can defer to the initial manufacturer, may be worse than no 
review at all.  The initial manufacturer may be slightly less careful in light 
of his knowledge that someone else is checking his work, and the reviewer 
will not in fact be able to determine whether or not all component parts 
were actually included. 
Second, in order to effectively transcend (and therefore have a chance 
to correct for) the pathologies of a particular organization, a review 
mechanism must be meaningfully independent.  In the engineering context, 
it is received wisdom that reliability increases only if systems do not rely 
on shared components, teams that share information analysis capabilities, 
and so forth.238  Insurance industry risk managers adopt a similar approach, 
giving control over loss prevention strategies to independent inspectors or 
third-party chaperones—that is, by separating the industry functions of 
production and “risk management,” and by ensuring that risk management 
inspectors have some meaningful power to enforce their conclusions.239  
The logic holds in the policy-making context.  One decisionmaker who 
takes the same information, applies the same decision-making criteria, and 
is in thrall of the same cultural organizational biases, is not like a back-up 
engine; he is more like a separate cog in the same engine. The functional 
effectiveness of both cogs is equally dependent on the overall health of the 
single engine.  If a single-engine plane loses its entire engine (or 
experiences some other catastrophic, systemic failure), it will not matter 
how well any one cog performs.240 
These lessons are visible again in the example of Abu Ghraib.  A 
professionally diverse set of groups—uniformed military, intelligence 
                                                                                                                          
238 See BENDOR, supra note 174, at 44–45. 
239 CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 206 (1985). 
240 SAGAN, supra note 158, at 273 (“The final advice, following the logic of high reliability 
theory, would recommend adding redundant safety devices and warning systems to those that already 
exist in order to create a more reliable system out of unreliable parts.”).  One of the reasons redundant 
systems can produce a misleading sense of confidence is because systems are not independent 
enough—and an error in one can precipitate an error in the next.  Id. at 39.   
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agency personnel, private contractors—all worked together under a unified 
prison command organization to perform the same or overlapping tasks 
involved with detaining and interrogating inmates.241  But rather than 
improving accuracy and performance through constructive competition, 
error correction or otherwise, there is evidence that the groups’ 
overlapping mandates created least-common-denominator competition and 
across-the-board confusion, serving to lower performance and increase the 
problem of shirking.  In a number of instances, the bad behavior of one 
group effectively convinced other groups to behave in similar ways.  As 
one Army investigation concluded: “The lack of [CIA] adherence to the 
practices and procedures established for accounting for detainees eroded 
the necessity in the minds of Soldiers and civilians for them to follow 
Army rules.”242  While some soldiers tried to report misconduct they 
observed by other actors, others believed it was not their place to report 
misconduct to their own supervisors.  One military intelligence soldier 
described one abuse incident: “it was [a military police] matter and would 
be handled by them.”243  Critically, such conditions were able to prevail in 
an environment where, as the military’s later investigations concluded, 
command exercised no regular oversight, routine inspections and 
monitoring were absent, and no JAG officers (military lawyers charged 
with monitoring operational legal compliance) appeared to have been 
dedicated to interrogation operations per se—a set of circumstances 
investigators described as a “contributing factor” to the many performance 
problems observed.244 
In contrast, consider the existing process of judicial review of police 
applications for search warrants.  The high rate at which search warrant 
applications are approved has led many to criticize the review process as 
too relaxed, not a meaningful check, and by extension unlikely to increase 
the accuracy of search decisions.245  But, because statistics have shown that 
warranted searches are almost always right—that is, the searches 
ultimately reveal criminal evidence of the kind the warrant application 
anticipated—a number of scholars have now embraced the view that the 
high approval rate suggests, rather, that the application is almost always 
                                                                                                                          
241 Fay Report, supra note 179, at 77–78.  
242 Id.  Vaughan’s “normalization of deviance,” supra note 175, seems to capture this 
phenomenon to a tee. 
243 Fay Report, supra note 179, at 106 (emphasis added). 
244 DAIG REPORT, supra note 179, at 15, 19; Fay Report, supra note 179, at 85. While independent 
ICRC monitors were allowed into the facility, they were denied access to information about all 
detainees.  In any case, repeated failures to respond to ICRC recommendations carried no necessary 
consequence for those being monitored.  See, e.g., id. at 118–19 (describing inadequate oversight of 
CIA interrogations in particular, unclear responsibility for follow up after ICRC visits, and lax 
accountability for troops engaged in abuse ). 
245 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1254 (2002) (arguing that many perceive the warrant requirement as useless). 
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rightly sought. 246  Their argument is based on studies showing that police 
officers view the process of preparing a warrant application as a significant 
cost (in time, effort, research required, etc.).  Given the weight of this 
burden, officers have a significant incentive not to pursue a warrant unless 
they are fairly certain to prevail.247 
These data alone may not suffice to establish whether the current 
review burden on search warrants is ideal (that is, whether it does not 
discourage officers from seeking warrants when they otherwise should).  
But, they do help demonstrate how a monitoring or review structure can 
avoid the problems associated with redundant structures discussed above.  
They are also consistent with the notion that the effective functioning of a 
review scheme need not necessarily depend on the reviewer having the 
same degree of expertise (including professional experience and judgment) 
as the officer making the application.  Rather, the review system works 
because it is not functionally duplicative (the warrant judge herself is not 
on the street doing the investigation) and avoids destructive competition; it 
is organizationally independent (from the police department) and also 
avoids replicating cultural pathologies that might have infected first-order 
decision-making; and it wields a set of incentives that are capable of 
altering first-order behavior in a measurable, and thus predictable, way. 
What, then, might we conclude about the new functionalists’ suspicion 
of extra-executive branch monitoring or review?  After all, if as we saw 
above, the raw effectiveness of a detention scheme in any given crisis 
depends on a set of calculations about the likelihood of public panic, the 
reaction of an enemy, the needs of sensitive international relationships, the 
availability of a certain kind of evidence, and so forth—how could one 
dispute that the executive is best positioned to make such an assessment?  
The first answer is that for purposes of assessing the scope and propriety 
of, say, judicial review, one need not dispute that whoever detains a 
suspect is in the first instance best positioned to decide on at least a 
temporary disposition.  Judicial review, especially in crisis circumstances, 
is by definition about the second instance; it comes after a reviewer has an 
opportunity to receive information presented to it by outside parties.248 
                                                                                                                          
246 Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 925 (1986) (summarizing a major study 
that measured the frequency with which warrant searches resulted in the seizure of evidence described 
in the warrant, based on the number of returns filed, and noting that in six of seven cities studied, 74% 
to 89% of searches resulted in the discovery of at least some of the evidence described in the warrant); 
see also Stephenson, supra note 236, at 800 & n. 139 (noting arguments that high success rate for 
search warrants may be explained by officers’ incentives to seek warrants only where they are likely to 
prevail). 
247 See Dripps, supra note 246, at 925 (“If the police view obtaining a warrant as a costly 
proposition, a proposed search would have to promise very likely returns to justify the expenditure of 
law-enforcement resources.”). 
248 Much of existing constitutional and relevant national security law is filled with exceptions to 
usual rules where exigent circumstances demand.  See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833 (1998) (holding that a death caused by a police officer driving recklessly in a high-speed car chase 
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But those who favor limited judicial review of executive detention 
must argue something more than the executive is most competent in the 
first instance.  Instead, they must argue that because the executive needs 
flexibility to make detention decisions quickly, quietly, and with 
specialized competence, second-instance examination (especially if less 
than deferential) is always problematic.249  An organizational analysis calls 
this conclusion into question.  Beyond simple error correction, some form 
of independent review or monitoring with full information and incentive-
creating capacity could function to check an organization’s tendencies to 
exclude relevant information in decision-making, help decisionmakers 
avoid capture by narrow conceptions of self-interest, correct decision-
making tendencies to miss the strategic forest for the tactical trees, and 
afford opportunities for organizational learning over time.  While 
redundant decision-making structures may slow down initial real-time 
decision-making, review structures need not.  And while secrecy may be 
important in a given case, there is no structural reason why review or 
monitoring cannot properly protect secret information through procedural 
rules or other sub-structural, ‘soft’ forms of regulation.250 
Finally, it is true that review structures (like redundant structures) are 
                                                                                                                          
does not violation the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 38, 41–43 (1976) (recognizing that police officer does not need search warrant during hot pursuit); 
see also U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”); 
50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2000) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the 
Attorney General reasonably determines that—(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the 
employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order 
authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and (2) the factual basis for issuance 
of an order under this subchapter to approve such surveillance exists; he may authorize the emergency 
employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is 
informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has 
been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this 
subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than twenty-four hours after the 
Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.”); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6–12 
(2004) (noting uniform agreement on executive’s constitutional power to “repel sudden attacks” 
without congressional authorization).  
249 As Posner and Vermeule put it: “[T]here is no general reason to think that judges can do better 
than [the executive branch] at balancing security and liberty during emergencies.”  POSNER & 
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 31; see also id. at 256–57 (concluding that “judges can do no better than 
the [executive] on average, and will probably do worse from lack of information and expertise”); 
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 101–02 (positing that any judicial effort to “second guess” political claims 
to declare a state of emergency in the aftermath of an attack will “inevitably parody the judicial ideal” 
and that “[t]here simply won’t be enough time for the dispassionate consideration of evidence and 
reasoned elaboration of judgment”).  But see ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 106–08 (contemplating 
“microadjudication” of individual rights claims six weeks following an attack).  
250 Indeed, unless one is willing to claim that review is always more harm than help—a claim our 
raw effectiveness analysis should call into doubt.  See supra text accompanying notes 163–67.  It 
remains at least possible that role effectiveness is served less well generally by a rule of no review, and 
better by a rule of, for example, traditional review so long as “the courts are open and their process 
unobstructed.” Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866). 
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inescapably more resource intensive.  But, there are at least two reasons 
why this calculation is more complex than the new functionalists credit.  
One is the concern discussed above—that there may be strategic burdens 
associated with erroneous decision-making that the new functionalists do 
not take into account.251  Second, if one takes seriously the conclusion 
above favoring the use of existing institutions, modified as little as possible 
in times of extraordinary demand, it becomes clear that the vast bulk of the 
costs associated with a review scheme are already sunk.  There are two 
other branches of government already doing a high-volume business 
evaluating a host of executive branch behaviors.  The marginal additional 
resource cost of evaluating any one additional program is likely to be low 
in proportion, and lower still the more one relies on systems whose rules 
and structures are already in place. 
IV.  REVISITING THE HAMILTONIAN VIRTUES: FUNCTIONAL SECURITY 
DETENTION 
Before finally applying these lessons more directly to designing an 
anti-terrorist detention scheme, it may be helpful to summarize what the 
foregoing discussion concluded about the kind of organizational structure 
likely to be most effective.  First, the system we want would encourage 
decisionmakers to anticipate and plan for trade-offs likely to be involved in 
terrorism-related decisions, particularly ensuring that any emergency 
decision-making takes into account relevant expertise, relying on personnel 
trained to carry out as many possible functions that exist whether or not 
conditions constitute an “emergency.”  Second, the system would include 
some mechanism to correct for the known pathologies of executive 
organizations engaged in security functions, a mechanism that would again 
need to be modified only modestly to function effectively in emergencies.  
Finally, the system would include some form of monitoring or review not 
only to create incentives that correct for existing organizational 
pathologies, but also to enhance opportunities for organizational learning 
over time.  The review structure should do something more than simply 
duplicate the decision-making process that went before.  Instead, it should 
be structurally and culturally independent of the organization it aims to 
check, and it should include incentives likely to predictably impact first-
decider behavior. 
These broad criteria offer a template against which one might begin to 
test the effectiveness of various security detention systems—the topic of 
much high-level federal engagement across branches in the post-September 
                                                                                                                          
251 See supra text accompanying notes 39–43. 
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11th United States,252 including the Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene 
v. Bush.253  Beginning with habeas litigation surrounding the military 
detention of U.S. citizen Jose Padilla in 2002, the courts have repeatedly 
confronted separation-of-powers questions in this context, including the 
questions whether the executive has the inherent authority to engage in 
military detention,254 and whether it is within the authority of the courts to 
consider the legality of executive military detention in a broadly conceived 
“war on terror.”255  To date, the Supreme Court has managed to avoid 
definitive resolution of the former question, ruling on venue grounds in its 
2004 hearing of the case of Jose Padilla,256 and finding adequate authority 
from congressional delegation in its 2004 ruling in the case of Yaser 
Hamdi.257  On the latter question, Boumediene answered in the affirmative, 
at least with respect to those currently held at Guantanamo Bay.258  
Nonetheless, it remains unresolved whether the courts’ authority to 
consider the legality of executive military detention extends to all detainees 
held in U.S. custody overseas.259  It is in part for this reason that the latter 
question of the courts’ role remains a central preoccupation of the new 
functionalists (among others).260 
                                                                                                                          
252 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (considering the “legality of the 
Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an ‘enemy combatant’”); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (addressing whether United States courts have jurisdiction to 
consider the legality of detentions at Guantanamo Bay); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636–37 (2006) (attempting to clarify procedures for review of 
detention decisions); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739–44 
(2005) (outlining prisoner treatment and detention protocol). 
253 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
254 Compare, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (finding statutory authority for detention in ongoing 
military operations in Afghanistan), and Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that the President has constitutional authority to detain U.S. citizen in military custody), 
with Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that “the President lacks 
inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on American soil 
outside a zone of combat.”), rev'd and remanded, 542 U.S. 426, 429 (2004), and Padilla v. Hanft, 389 
F. Supp. 2d 678, 691 (D.S.C. 2005) (finding that the President lacks authority to detain U.S. citizen in 
military custody). 
255 See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (finding that the District Court has jurisdiction to consider 
habeas challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (“Petitioners . . . are 
entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”). 
256 Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 430.  
257 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
258 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (holding Guantanamo detainees have constitutional right to 
seek writ of habeas corpus); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (recognizing statutory availability of 
habeas writs for detainees held at Guantanamo Bay). 
259 Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259–60 (holding extraterritorial reach of Suspension Clause 
depends on functional analysis of circumstances of detention). 
260 See Kenneth Anderson, U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with 
International Human Rights Norms, Remarks to the New York University Law School International 
Human Rights Colloquium (March 5, 2007), in 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 455, 476–81 (2007) 
(discussing challenges posed by contemporary counterterrorism and the potential role for judicial 
decision-making); Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of 
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008) (evaluating challenges of 
security-related detention programs); A. John Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level 
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This Part takes a first cut at applying the foregoing organizational 
criteria to three of the detention schemes most often discussed by the new 
functionalists and in current debates: (1) a unitary executive regime, in 
which detention authority flows from Article II alone and decisional 
review, if any, is also within Article II; (2) a statutorily authorized 
detention scheme, in which broad congressional authority to engage in 
detention is subject to rigorous reporting and oversight requirements by 
key committees; and (3) a statutorily authorized detention scheme with ex 
post, de novo review of detention decisions by an independent tribunal. 
A.  Unitary Executive Detention 
In theory, a detention scheme involving only the executive branch in 
set-up and function might be able to operate quickly and in secret.261  But it 
raises a range of concerns against the functional effectiveness criteria 
proposed here.  For example, it is theoretically possible that the executive 
would design and operate a detention scheme to function principally in 
non-war or emergency settings and that could remain functional with 
minimal adjustments during emergencies.  Indeed, the well-developed 
military justice system does just that.  But the military justice system that 
exists is of course the product of an elaborate statutory scheme, designed 
to perform a chronic function of military governance.  It is hard to 
conceive of an organizational or political incentive that would drive an 
individual, term-limited executive to bear the political burden of setting up 
and running a new detention scheme, with no certainty or expectation that 
it would continue beyond that administration, other than an acute short-
term need.262  Likewise, an executive-driven detention initiative need not 
(and for similar reasons is unlikely to) incorporate planning incentives or 
                                                                                                                          
Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1227, 1242–52 (2006) (proposing a novel approach to including judicial 
oversight in terrorist interrogation and detention). 
261 It is at least noteworthy, however, that the post-9/11 CIA prison scheme, for example, has done 
neither.  See Neil A. Lewis & Mark Mazzetti, Lawyers Weighing Suits Over C.I.A.’s Secret Jails, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting on “secret” CIA 
detention program); Mark Mazzetti, Questions Raised About Bush’s Primary Claims in Defense of 
Secret Detention System, N.Y. TIMES, September 8, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
NYT File (noting reports of detainee and prisoner treatment despite clandestine nature of operations); 
Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing Within Agency About 
Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. POST, November 2, 2005, at A1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (reporting disclosure of detainee treatment procedures 
by Congressional and Public Interest sources). 
262 See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 57 (“[P]residents are especially reluctant to push for agency 
reforms in the absence of a crisis or in the presence of anticipated resistance. . . . Although dozens of 
investigations, commissions, and experts identified shortcomings in the U.S. Intelligence Community 
between 1947, when the CIA was created, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, no president 
attempted major intelligence reform.  Rational self-interest explains why.”).  Zegart offers a useful 
account based on organization theory and political science (rational choice theory) as to why the 
President and executive agencies find it so difficult to engage in adaptation or reform absent a crisis or 
other external force.  See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 50–60. 
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other mechanisms that help to mitigate errors associated with “emergency” 
decision-making. 
Is an executive-only system capable of correcting for the decision-
making pathologies of involved decision-making organizations?  After all, 
some executive agency internal review systems have functioned well.263  
Here, however, there is reason to be skeptical that a review process internal 
to the executive branch could exercise enough independence to overcome 
organizational barriers.  The concern is particularly acute for review fully 
within the military, where the habit of secrecy is readily accommodated, 
and organizational loyalties may create incentives for decisionmakers to 
cover mistakes, incentives at times compounded by public political 
demands.264  Given the likelihood that a non-statutory military detention 
system has been created in and for a special circumstance, there is a 
heightened risk that the system will lack standard operating procedures, 
professionally developed norms, or other features that can combat the 
organizational tendencies of concern.265  Would an executive-only 
detention system fair better if operated by a civilian organization like the 
CIA or the FBI (setting aside for the moment other likely constitutional 
concerns with such programs)?  It is unclear.  Both organizations have 
shown themselves in the past to have fierce inter- and intra-organizational 
loyalties that have restricted information sharing, arbitrarily limited the 
information and expertise available to aid intra-agency decision-making, 
and inhibited organizational learning.266  In the detention context 
specifically, the problem of a lack of standard operating procedures or 
professionally developed norms has seemed worse for the CIA, which had 
no formal tradition or practice of detention operations,267 than for the 
military, which at least has a strong tradition of certain kinds of 
adjudicatory functions.268 
                                                                                                                          
263 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 
253–54 (2006) (elaborating on efficiency of internal auditing programs). 
264 See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA W. DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A 
PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA (2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885659 (reviewing accuracy of detention decisions); SAGAN, 
supra note 158, at 252–59; see also supra text accompanying notes 212–14. 
265 This was certainly the case with the specially created Guantanamo Bay military commissions, 
created by presidential order in November 2001.  See, e.g., Human Rights First, Observations of 
Military Commission Trial Monitors (2004-07), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
us_law/detainees/military_commission_diary.htm (describing inadequacies of initial military review of 
detention issues in Guantanamo). 
266 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 407–19 (2004) (discussing communication 
inadequacies in the intelligence community and the need for enhanced agency collaboration); ZEGART, 
supra note 173, at 38, 52 (detailing results of eighteen major classified and unclassified reports, 
prepared between 1991–2001, on U.S. government intelligence reform). 
267 For more information, see interviews on record with author. 
268 See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 
VA. J. INT'L L. 5, 31–56 (2005) (detailing the evolution of military commissions throughout early 
American history).  One might here fairly ask about the effectiveness of an existing, quasi-judicial 
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Finally, contrary to the new functionalist claims that the executive is 
unlikely to exaggerate the danger posed by an individual or detain too 
many people,269 organization analysis suggests a host of reasons why an 
organization (especially an effectively insular one) acting alone will not be 
effective in evaluating just the kind of cost-benefit trade-offs an individual 
detention decision requires.  Even beyond concerns about organizational 
loyalty and agency problems, the incentives of a political branch actor 
alone in any given case seems likely to guarantee a skewed evaluation of 
trade-offs; the potential short-term tactical advantage of detaining an 
individual will seemingly always outweigh strategic goals (particularly 
goals whose realization may be beyond the political event horizon).270  
Whatever executive branch actors may enjoy in the way of expert 
judgment, and whether or not the engagement of other branches could 
overcome this problem, it is difficult to imagine any executive agency 
wholly immune from such an imperative.   
B.  Administrative Detention 
Next, consider a version of a statutorily authorized security detention 
scheme, with some form of executive agency review of individual cases 
and congressional supervision of the entire apparatus.  Given the flexibility 
of legislative design, one could imagine, in theory, a detention structure 
designed to function in normal and in emergency circumstances that 
incorporated requirements or incentives to help ensure that emergency 
functions, when deployed, would function smoothly and swiftly in the face 
of a variety of exigencies or contingencies.  Procedural safeguards could 
likewise be constructed to ensure secrecy where necessary.  With a 
statutory requirement of an adversarial (or even inquisitorial) information-
gathering process that insists upon the disgorgement of all relevant 
                                                                                                                          
organ of the executive branch, like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the “FISC”).  As the 
FISC is staffed with Article III judges, surely such actors are free or could be free from the “total 
institution” pathologies of concern.  Yet while the FISC is aided significantly by its Article III 
composition (indeed, it is doubtful one can appropriately consider the FISC an “executive” court), the 
FISC by design forecloses information and expertise critical to detention decision-making by 
conducting only ex parte proceedings.  In this regard, the information on which it can base its decision 
is unlikely able to overcome whatever information failings the executive organizations that appear 
before it suffer. 
269 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing arguments regarding the potential 
for executive overreaching in the context of counterterrorism strategy). 
270 See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 103–04 (attributing CIA’s failure in 2000 to track known Al 
Qaeda operatives from Malaysia to Thailand in part to short-term needs crowding out even slightly 
longer term requirements) (“Without strong incentives to reward analysts for peering over the horizon, 
following cases over time, and developing strategic intelligence, the urgent crowded out the 
important.”); see also WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 4–5 (“Across the board, the 
Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world’s 
most dangerous actors.  In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or ten years ago . . . . The 
Intelligence Community we have today is buried beneath an avalanche for demands for ‘current 
intelligence . . . .”). 
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information from all available sources for individual cases, as well as 
system-wide oversight by Congress to assess global trade-offs (like 
tactical/strategic) not always discernable in a single case, such a system 
could theoretically avoid some of the important disadvantages of an 
executive-only system. 
Nonetheless, such a system would still encounter a cluster of 
organizational hurdles.  First, as with the executive branch, Congress is 
structured to respond first and foremost to political incentives—incentives 
that provide modest reason to act in the absence of an immediate crisis.  
While emergency decision-making pitfalls could be avoided, they may not 
be.271  Second, even a legislatively crafted system of executive review is 
unlikely to avoid all of the “total institution” problems that plagued the 
unitary executive review processes discussed above.  Even if it avoids the 
difficulties of emergency-exclusive design and operating procedures, the 
same organizational and political loyalties (if not lack of professional 
commitments) that created incentives for decisionmakers to cover mistakes 
in the executive-only system are likely to be at play here.  Both the initial 
agency decisionmaker and the agency reviewer respond to the same 
political imperatives of the executive administration.272  Further, a system 
of ostensibly, but not actually, independent agency reviewers, chosen 
presumably because of an expectation of their particular expertise, exposes 
decision-making from the beginning to a serious “problem of 
redundancy”—everyone may be less careful because of their belief that 
someone at some other point in the line will correct any mistakes. 
Finally, while the prospect of some level of congressional monitoring 
may help to avoid some of the arbitrary evaluation of trade-offs found in 
an executive-only decision-making regime, congressional oversight itself 
has significant limitations.  The relevant committee staffs are structurally 
overwhelmed, stymied by secrecy requirements,273 engaged by political 
loyalties, and may be incapable during a period of single-party government 
control of overcoming executive stonewalling in accessing necessary 
information.274  The efficacy of congressional monitoring may also be 
                                                                                                                          
271 See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 57–58, 154–55 (contending that fragmented committee 
oversight system and electorial incentives compromised congressional success in intelligence reform).  
272 See Kagan, supra note 104, at 2331–32 (discussing the accountability advantages of executive 
administration decision-making).   
273 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 420 (2004) (finding that House and Senate 
intelligence committees “lack the power, influence, and sustained capability” to meet the challenges 
facing the nation’s intelligence agencies); see also FREDERICK M. KAISER, A JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLIGENCE: PROPOSALS AND OPTIONS FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND OTHERS (2004), available 
at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32525.pdf (reviewing proposals to revise congressional oversight 
structures to solve current failings); Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play; Did Bush Roll Past the Legal 
Stop Signs?, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File 
(arguing that secret briefings to intelligence committee leaders alone—without staff input or possibility 
for analysis—leaves little chance for meaningful congressional oversight). 
274 See Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1195–97 (2006) 
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hamstrung by duplicative or competing jurisdictions among relevant 
oversight committees, duplication that may make agency reporting 
demands more burdensome than necessary.275  Moreover, while general 
congressional oversight may be especially effective at evaluating systemic 
trade-offs (whether the system inflames more than incapacitates our 
enemies, for example), Congress is not designed to make—indeed, is 
generally constitutionally foreclosed from making—decisions about 
individual cases.  So while congressional engagement and oversight can 
certainly improve in some respects over an executive-only regime, it seems 
unable to overcome all organizational deficits. 
C.  Standard Detention 
Finally, consider a federal regime featuring general ex ante statutory 
authorization of detention, coupled with non-deferential ex post judicial 
review.  There can be little question that a standard, habeas-like review of 
federal detention functions today primarily in non-emergency settings.  
Constitutional rules have also arguably anticipated and answered the 
question of how review operates in an emergency: when Congress wants to 
suspend it, it can;276 and when it absolutely cannot operate, it does not until 
it can again.277  Such extant rules, aided by the highly decentralized nature 
of the federal judiciary (when one court is incapacitated, others can and do 
still function) and life-tenure protection of federal judges, arguably 
overcome concerns about speed (when review allows detention first, 
questions only after the fact, and only as soon as practicable) and political 
skewing. 
Structurally speaking, the prospect of genuinely independent, non-
deferential review of individual detention decisions could also create 
incentives for executive detaining authorities to plan for detention 
operations for a variety of emergency contingencies.  This could include 
standard emergency operating procedures and training for agents to ensure 
appropriate consideration of key trade-offs.278  Additionally, rule-based 
                                                                                                                          
(noting Congress’ inability to engage in meaningful oversight of executive detention programs after 
September 11). 
275 See Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design 
of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 704–07 (2006) (discussing this and related problems 
associated with congressional oversight structures). 
276 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
277 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866); see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 
323–24 (1946) (interpreting Hawaiian Organic Act to permit military trials of civilians only in event of 
“actual or threatened rebellion or invasion”). 
278 Cf. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical 
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1030–51 (1987) (describing the 
beneficial impact of the exclusionary rule in deterring police corruption); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., 
Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 
U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 123–32 (1992) (outlining the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police 
perjury). 
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evaluations—what a court does when it applies a statutory standard to an 
individual case—can also be effective in enforcing attention to pre-
established emergency priorities, potentially correcting or deterring goal 
displacement by organizational agents.  Indeed, a record of regular 
individualized review, accompanied by reasons, might provide an excellent 
method of recording the information necessary to enable organizational 
learning over time. 
How would judicial review serve to address the tendency of key 
executive agencies to disdain outside expertise, or even to foreclose 
competing views within the organization?  Unlike a reviewing body 
internal to the executive branch, even an expert judge cannot properly 
bring his own independent knowledge to bear on an evaluation.  Even if a 
court can force the disgorgement of relevant information from the 
detaining agency, we tend to think of expertise as comprising something 
more than just information; it carries some implication of experience and 
fluency in a professionally recognized methodology as well.279  A 
generalist court arguably has neither when it comes to security detainees.  
But just as with “hard look” review in the standard administrative law 
context—reviewing not the substance of the agency decision per se, but 
whether the agency had rational factual and logical reasons for deciding as 
it did—there is reason to doubt that expertise in the reviewer is necessary 
for the purpose of policing the cultural and arbitrariness concerns 
highlighted by organization analysis.  If the problem is that decisionmakers 
did not consider outside information or expertise, then that omission is 
likely to manifest itself in evident ways other than in decisions the rational 
expert would find “bad.”  Binding review by an independent body can 
drive an incentive structure that forces the anticipation of and planning for 
key threats that, whenever possible, favors the internal consideration of 
competing information and expertise.280 
Even with those advantages, however, at least some concerns remain.  
For instance, while a court may be well positioned to consider trade-offs at 
stake in an individual case (particularly when such trade-offs are addressed 
in a well-formed statutory scheme), it is less clear that individualized 
review could address overarching trade-offs of a detention system (again, 
for example, whether the detention approach to detention alienates more 
enemies than it deters).  Here, it seems something additional is required, 
such as a body based in the legislative branch insulated from the structural 
                                                                                                                          
279 See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993) (noting the essential factors 
to be considered when determining the sufficiency of proffered expert testimony). 
280 This is precisely what happened as police agencies developed internal mechanisms for 
preparing search warrant applications, mechanisms that appear to serve as an additional check against 
erroneous applications.  See Dripps, supra note 246, at 930 (describing internal review process in law 
enforcement bureaucracy in which line officer must present warrant application first to organizational 
superior). 
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and political weaknesses of the committee process, but free of the 
institutional loyalties of executive branch agencies, and capable of 
evaluating bigger picture trade-offs of any detention scheme.  Finally, of 
course, there are arguments of institutional habit.  Will courts ever treat 
security cases the way they treat, say, securities cases?  It is uncertain.  But 
we will certainly not be able to answer such empirical questions without 
conducting the experiment in practice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article began by posing two questions raised by new functionalist 
claims in favor of broad executive authority in matters of national security: 
(1) Should functional interests matter in resolving constitutional 
separation-of-powers disputes?  (2)  If so, how should a decisionmaker 
evaluate whether a particular distribution of power among the branches is 
functionally effective?  The answer to the first question is an unmodified 
yes; while formal dictates must always play a central role in constitutional 
decision-making, history, logic, and the reality of constitutional 
governance insist that at least some identified functional interests factor 
into our understanding of the separation of powers.  The answer to the 
second question is a more cautious blend of interpretive do’s and don’ts.  
Courts and policy-makers must recognize and distinguish raw effectiveness 
claims when they see them, and avoid the temptation to accept such 
arguments at face value especially when they claim to resolve the role of 
decision-making structures.  We should not assume national security-
related questions are any less susceptible of rational evaluation than any 
other category of decision.  And we should avoid easy reliance on 
historical assumptions of “institutional competence,” in favor of more 
realistic considerations of organizational character. 
The separation-of-powers issues presented by various security 
detention schemes remain especially useful examples to test, not only 
because of their continued salience as a policy matter, but also because 
formal analysis has proven frustratingly unable to resolve the question to 
what extent the courts have the authority to conduct, for example, “[a]ny 
evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a 
person is an enemy combatant.”281  At the highest level of generality, the 
Constitution’s text provides no reason for doubting that it falls within the 
judiciary’s general federal question jurisdiction to determine whether an 
individual’s detention is in violation of the Constitution.282  Nor is there 
textual basis for doubting that war-related detention falls within this power.  
On the contrary, the federal courts are given jurisdiction over criminal 
                                                                                                                          
281 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 474 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
282 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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treason cases, defined as “levying war” against the United States.283  It is 
difficult to imagine how such cases would arise except following the 
detention of an individual accused by the executive of just such conduct.  It 
is likewise difficult to imagine that the courts would not then be expected 
to determine whether the alleged conduct amounted to the levying of 
war.284  While the act of detention may be executive in nature, one could 
equally say, as a formal matter, that grants of authority to detain are 
legislative in nature,285 and that determining the propriety of a deprivation 
of liberty is judicial in nature.286  To the extent one accepts that judicial 
review is a core function of the judiciary at all, formal analysis gives one 
every reason to think review of executive detention is within the courts’ 
authority here.287  And if one accepts that the exercise of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction in particular is at the core of judicial power, then the exercise 
of full judicial review of executive detention is not only permissible but 
required.288 
Despite all this, both the prisoner-of-war scheme contemplated by 
modern international humanitarian law289 and some of the Court’s own 
case law 290 seem satisfied, at least in the first instance, with nothing more 
than internal executive branch review of the propriety of executive 
                                                                                                                          
283 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3, cl. 1.  
284 Indeed, the federal courts have been faced with treason-related cases more than once in the 
past two centuries of jurisprudence.  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 559–61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing cases). 
285 Understood as an issue of whether the detention power is one that has “the purpose and effect 
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,” the argument becomes strong that 
detention authority is legislative by its nature. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); cf. also 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (limiting a judge’s ability to impose a prison sentence 
greater than the maximum determined by the legislature). 
286 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974) (rejecting President’s separation-of-
powers argument that judiciary lacks power to subpoena tapes on the grounds that such a restriction 
would “gravely impair” the courts’ ability to do justice in criminal prosecutions). 
287 Id. 
288 See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking that Article III and the Supremacy Clause Demand of the Federal Courts, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 884 (1998) (concluding that Article III “judicial power” must include, inter 
alia, the capacity of a federal court to conduct an independent determination of “every—and the 
entire—question affecting the normative scope of supreme law,” and the capacity “to effectuate the 
court's judgment in the case and in precedentially controlled cases”). 
289 See Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 
1949, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm (outlining international mandates that 
pertain to POW treatment and detention); Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm (detailing international expectations of enemy conduct 
when detaining civilian populations); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8 ENEMY 
PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES (1997), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf (outlining proper administration and 
operation of enemy prisoner of war detention facilities). 
290 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (leaving open possibility that executive 
agency review of military detention could satisfy due process standards); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 774–75 (1950) (“Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by 
litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security.”). 
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detention.  The reasons invariably given in support of less-than-normal 
judicial review relate centrally to raw and role effectiveness concerns.  As 
Justice O’Connor put it in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: “[T]he full protections that 
accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove 
unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting.”291  It has 
proven necessary to consider the purposive separation-of-powers interests 
of liberty and political accountability, as well as the more complex 
effectiveness interests just discussed. 
As a matter of purposive impact, it should come as little surprise that 
separation-of-powers liberty interests favor some independent review.292  
At the same time, one could reasonably argue that political accountability 
is best served, in contrast, by leaving such judgments in the hands of the 
elected leaders.  Even assuming a context in which Congress has not 
addressed the propriety of security detention, if the executive repeatedly 
fails to take relevant information into account in detention decisions, the 
“consequences” he faces are, properly, electoral, not legal.  But in addition 
to obvious concerns about how the rights of insular minorities would fare 
in such a scheme, the key problem with this argument is that it proves far 
too much.  Judicial review raises counter-majoritarian concerns in every 
setting, not just in matters of security.  Unless there is some reason for 
                                                                                                                          
291 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.  Indeed Justice O’Connor’s analysis is an efficient blend of purposive, 
role, and raw effectiveness functionalism:   
Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of war-
making belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically 
accountable for making them.  The Government also argues at some length that its 
interests in reducing the process available to alleged enemy combatants are 
heightened by the practical difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like 
process. In its view, military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging 
battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world 
away, and discovery into military operations would both intrude on the sensitive 
secrets of national defense and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the 
rubble of war.  To the extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened 
procedures, they are properly taken into account in our due process analysis.  
Id. at 531–32 (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778–79 (1950) 
(“To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the seas for 
hearing.  This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It 
might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as 
transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sentence . . . . It would be difficult to devise 
more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to 
submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the 
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.  Nor is it unlikely that the result of such 
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to 
enemies of the United States.”). 
292 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540–41 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At 
the argument of this case, in fact, the Government . . . suggested that as long as a prisoner could 
challenge his enemy combatant designation when responding to interrogation during incommunicado 
detention he was accorded sufficient process to support his designation as an enemy combatant.  See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 40; id. at 42 (“[H]e has an opportunity to explain it in his own words” “[d]uring 
interrogation”).  Since on either view judicial enquiry so limited would be virtually worthless as a way 
to contest detention, the Government's concession of jurisdiction to hear Hamdi's habeas claim is more 
theoretical than practical, leaving the assertion of Executive authority close to unconditional.”).  
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assuming the counter-majoritarian problem is greater in the security 
setting—or that security decisions are some how more appropriately 
political than, say, health policy decisions—the accountability claim seems 
no more salient here than in any situation involving ex post judicial review.  
Moreover, if our functional effectiveness discussion above suggests 
anything, it is that key aspects of security decision-making (at the very 
least in the nuclear terrorism context) are intensely fact-based, aided more 
by professional expertise than by popular judgment.  Given that some 
security risks may attend both under-detention and under-review,293 
political accountability concerns are at best a wash, and at worst 
counterproductive (if responsive to irrational pressures) when it comes to 
crisis-driven detention.294   
The new functionalists thus do a service by considering effectiveness 
arguments here.  But their raw effectiveness claims flounder on the facts, 
and a more thorough review of policy empirics may lead at best to 
different answers depending on the circumstances.  For policy-makers and 
policy evaluators, the question of how one assesses role effectiveness 
interests thus weighs heavily.  The insights of organization analysis paint a 
complex but striking picture of how our national security organizations 
may be expected to handle a security detention regime—a picture, this 
Article suggests, that reveals a more competent security detention scheme 
as one that engages all three branches of government in design, review and 
monitoring functions.  There is no doubt more to be done in exploring this 
application.  In the meantime, there remains a clear lesson for 
constitutional interpretation: Hamilton only begins the conversation about 
functional constitutional power. 
                                                                                                                          
293 See supra text accompanying notes 163–64 regarding the risks of under-review. 
294 See Cohen et al., supra note 275, at 702–14 (discussing arguments supporting questionable 
accountability gains). 
